jordan pulse -

Ahmad Abdelbaset Rjoub

Researcher and Strategic Planner

Disclaimer: This article is not a promotion for any intelligence agency. It is merely an attempt to put the facts in the hands of readers, hoping it may contribute to increasing awareness and understanding, and serve as a call for the security awakening that has become an urgent necessity in an era where fates intersect.

When Secrets Turn into an "Open Book"

In a notable development, the security landscape in the region is witnessing a phenomenon worth examining: the ability to execute qualitative operations, preceded or accompanied by a time gap in announcing the results. What were once considered "impregnable walls" have become an "open book" before Israeli agencies. Observers notice an intelligence "scoop" in announcing the results of sensitive operations, as if the operations rooms in Tel Aviv are sitting at the decision-making tables in Tehran and Beirut. This time gap is no longer a detail, but evidence of the scale of the penetration.

The Pagers That Killed Thousands: A Lesson in "Installment Treason"

The operations detonating wireless communication devices (pagers) that targeted thousands of Lebanese were not just a passing security incident, but an intelligence earthquake by all measures. Simultaneous explosions left more than 30 dead and nearly 3,000 wounded. What is truly astonishing is that the planning lasted ten full years. According to confessions of former Mossad agents, the Israeli occupation entity set up shell companies in Hungary and other countries to deceive the Taiwanese manufacturer "Gold Apollo." The pagers were manufactured slightly larger to hide the explosive materials and were tested on dummies multiple times to determine the appropriate amount that would only harm the bearer.

The greater danger: The new generation of espionage no longer relies on "ideological betrayal," but on exploiting simple human needs. When people buy devices from the market, or are employed in seemingly ordinary jobs, they may, unknowingly, be part of a fictitious world created by hostile intelligence services.

From the Assassination of Nasrallah to Targeting Leadership in Iran: Has the Penetration Reached the "Yellow Circle"?

The most shocking scene was the assassination of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, on September 27, 2024, in an Israeli airstrike targeting a leadership meeting in the southern suburb of Beirut. How did Israel know the exact location and timing of the meeting?

Even more dangerous, what happened on February 28, 2026, when Israel announced the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the first wave of strikes on Tehran. After hours of conflicting media reports, official Iranian television confirmed the news of his death. It didn't stop there; on March 18, 2026, Iran confirmed the assassination of Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, in a Zionist strike that targeted him, his son Mortaza, one of his aides, and several of his guards.

Most notably, The Wall Street Journal revealed that the targeting of Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani, commander of the Basij forces, came after a report from Iranians stating he was hiding with his aides in a tent in a wooded area in Tehran, which was bombed immediately. All these indicators suggest that the penetration may have reached the "Yellow Circle" – meaning those closest to the primary decision-maker. Some analyses suggest that Israel might be capable of targeting first-tier leaders, implying that traditional Iranian deterrence is no longer sufficient to protect state symbols.

The greatest catastrophe is that Israel no longer settles for assassination but announces the news before the targeted state can comprehend what happened. The "Saturday Dinner" narrative, promoted in Israeli circles, revealed that senior Israeli military leaders went home for their Saturday dinner on Friday night, just hours before the strike that assassinated Khamenei, in a step designed to deceive Iranian intelligence. This means the operations room in Tel Aviv knows what is happening in Iranian hospitals and headquarters moment by moment.

Gaza: An Exception That Confounds the Equation

On the opposite side, the Palestinian resistance in Gaza stands as a witness to an astonishing paradox. After more than two years of devastating war, despite the immense technological superiority, Israel remains unable to determine the location of Israeli prisoners or even their bodies with precision. Why? Because Israel could not recruit the "first ring" close to the resistance's decision-maker.

This fact is acknowledged by Israeli officials themselves. In a rare admission, a senior intelligence commander revealed that the occupation army sometimes deliberately avoided killing certain Hamas members because they possessed sensitive information about the prisoners' locations. But that didn't open closed doors.

Herein lies the secret: Maintaining the confidentiality of information requires exceptional security awareness and the ability to isolate the most sensitive circles from any potential penetration. Gaza has proven that technology alone is not enough, and that belief in the cause remains the strongest shield.

Where Are the Countries' Intelligence Agencies?

The most pressing question: Where were the intelligence agencies in the countries that were penetrated? How did things reach this level of exposure?

The problem is that some countries treated the intelligence threat as a traditional file, while the tools of penetration developed astonishingly. The Mossad no longer just plants agents; it controls supply chains and creates entire virtual worlds. The Financial Times claimed that Unit 8200 and the Mossad managed to penetrate most surveillance cameras in Tehran, specifically a camera near Pasteur Street, and analyze data using algorithms and "social network analysis" to build an accurate "life map" of the guards and drivers surrounding Khamenei.

But does this mean Arab intelligence agencies have completely failed? Not necessarily. In Gaza, the resistance proved an exceptional ability to protect its information. Also, Israel itself experienced a major penetration on October 7, 2023, when it was surprised by the Hamas attack despite all its apparatuses.

Two Explanations for the Scene of Exposure

First: Technological superiority. Cyber warfare has reached unprecedented levels. The pager operations are prime evidence of supply chain infiltration.

Second: Human penetration. The ability to employ ordinary people in espionage without their knowledge. Recruitment that doesn't rely on loyalty but on exploiting need. As happened with the Iranians who reported the location of the Basij commander, the ordinary citizen may become a tool in the hands of hostile intelligence without realizing it.

Conclusion: The Battle of Lost Deterrence

What is happening today goes beyond military operations. It is a complete erosion of "security deterrence." When one party announces its strikes before the targeted state can process the news, it means the deterrence equation has collapsed. One tweeter accurately described the scene, saying: "It seems that high-ranking positions in Iran have become high-risk jobs! Whenever an official is promoted, he gets closer to the targeting list."

The fear is not confined to the repercussions of this exposure on any particular state, but rather in it being an indicator of the fragility of the regional security system. The question remains: Is the region on the verge of entering a new phase where information becomes the deadliest weapon?

The coming days will suffice to reveal the scale of the catastrophe, after it's too late.