jordan pulse -
Since the first week of the war on Gaza, it has become clear what the Israeli occupation army is trying to do, which is to act like a “pincer” on northern Gaza by entering two lines of forces, the first from the north around Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun, and the second from central Gaza, south of the Zaytoun neighborhood. Then the two lines move to meet at one point near the Gaza port on the sea, in the hope that this will help prevent Al-Qassam soldiers from receiving supplies.
This has not happened yet. In fact, the first movements of the occupation forces inside the Gaza Strip were in open agricultural areas almost devoid of residents. Once they began to enter urban terrain (such as buildings), their progress became slower and the losses became heavier. Indeed, according to a statement issued by the Al-Qassam Brigades, the line The course of Israeli operations has changed, and it appears that the meeting point (the port) has shifted slightly into Gaza due to the intense resistance that the occupation forces are facing, which has prompted them to take routes that they think are easier.
There is a big difference between penetrating an area and occupying and keeping it. Entering the city during war is (relatively) easy, but staying in it is very complicated. Hence, the details of urban war serve the Qassams, not the occupation, as military theorists know that defense is The strongest tactical position in urban warfare, because it takes a much greater force to attack and defeat forces located within urban terrain, and because many physical structures provide immediate defensive positions of excellent military quality.
There are five types of defensive battle sites that Qassam soldiers know, as every army in the world knows. The first is the primary site, which is the site that covers the path that the enemy coming from afar is likely to cross. As for the alternative site, it is a defensive site designated by the commander so that the soldiers move to it when it becomes the primary site. Indefensible.
The third type is supplementary sites, which are sites within the area of operations that provide the best fire strike positions and defensive terrain along another road that is not the main road through which the enemy is expected to attack. As for the fourth type, they are the subsequent sites that the unit expects to move to later during the course of the battle.
Qassami Strength Points
Finally, the fifth type appears, which is the “strength point” locations. In military tactics, a “strong point” is defined as a point in a defensive fighting position that can take different forms but the basic condition is that it should not be easily crossed or avoided. Therefore, ideally, the defensive terrain of the strongpoint is usually better, and is surrounded by obstacles that prevent the advance of attacking forces. And in cities, as you can notice, it is very present.
The urban terrain is to the advantage of Qassam Brigades commanders, as they can find distinct areas for the five sites mentioned above, and if the Qassam forces lose a strong defensive point, they can quickly find next strong points, and thus the war is more like moving from house to house.
Strong points play a decisive role in maintaining defensive positions, and are difficult to overcome, and they at least prolong the battle and cause great losses among the attackers (occupation). In addition, many buildings are built using steel-reinforced concrete, which makes them impervious to many. Of weapons and military penetration tactics.
All this and we have not yet talked about the supply lines for the defenders, which are almost zero in length, as the Qassams can store resources inside closed rooms. In addition, the urban terrain reduces the capabilities of the attackers in the fields of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as drones, for example, cannot penetrate the walls to detect tools. Resistance movements in specific areas and directing the occupation forces to them.
In the end, the defender can see the incoming attacker and engage him, because the attacker has limited cover. On the contrary, despite all the technology possessed by the most advanced armies in the world, in an attack on a city, crossing the street can pose one of the greatest risks to the lives of the attacking soldiers. This is what is actually happening in northern Gaza currently, where occupation soldiers cross the street through armored vehicles or tanks, or perhaps by passing from house to house by blowing up walls and making holes in them. But not all the streets are the same width, and the soldier must eventually get off his armor to pass through one of the squares.
Add to that a very important point in this context: although advance missile strikes can benefit the attacking army by reducing the strength of the defenders before entering the city, the urban terrain destroyed by these strikes creates a greater obstacle to the attacking ground forces, as they do not pass through them easily even with... The presence of the most powerful bulldozers, in addition to providing irregular points where the Qassamists can hide and hunt the occupation soldiers.
Advantages of snipers
Therefore, Al-Qassam has always invested in light weapons and sniper rifles in particular, as it knows that the final conflict will be inside the city, and no matter how advanced technology is, a single sniper individual can be equivalent to an entire force if he uses his equipment appropriately and chooses multiple and strong positioning areas.
In 2014, the Al-Qassam Brigades announced that it had manufactured a sniper rifle that it confirmed had a lethal range of up to two kilometers. It called it the “Ghoul.” In a video published by the Brigades, sniping operations were shown against Israeli army soldiers with this “Ghoul” rifle. In 2018, it released Hamas took pictures of Israeli soldiers in the range of its snipers. The bullets were never fired at that time, but the picture was intended to clarify that the occupation soldiers were always in the range of Hamas snipers.
During the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, a spokesman for the Israeli occupation army told Agence France-Presse that Hamas snipers opened fire on observation points spread along the breached security fence. Day after day, resistance soldiers are developing their capabilities in this area, simply because it is considered a striking force in urban wars. .
One of the most famous examples at this range is the 1942 Battle of Stalingrad, where snipers proved particularly effective, killing hundreds of attacking German troops. Soviet snipers mastered the use of urban terrain and developed new tactics such as using old barrel positions to hide and striking from unpredictable areas.
Familiarity with the terrain
Add to that another important point, which is that the resistance possesses superior knowledge of the region, unlike the occupation soldiers. This knowledge includes everything, from the smallest gates to the places to jump from building to building, and accordingly, this knowledge provides them with a very important characteristic, which is the ability to surprise the enemy. We see this clearly in the Al-Qassam videos, where a resistance soldier appears from almost nowhere to strike an armored vehicle or tank from the side, even at a distance smaller than the range of the launcher, which has a very significant impact on the effectiveness of the missile.
It even reaches the point where resistance soldiers are able to reach the tank or armored vehicle directly and place an explosive device on it, simply because every place in the city is a potential source of danger for the occupation soldiers, and this alone is enough to afflict many of them with terror and suspicion, so things like a simple fall of a piece of rock become Or the rustle of trees on the side of the road to red lights flashing everywhere.
This explains the destruction of a relatively large number of Israeli military vehicles in Gaza by the resistance forces. The number reached approximately 150 tanks, armored vehicles, and bulldozers. Satellite images even showed a clear decrease in the presence of military vehicles in northern Gaza by the time we arrived on November 13. This November.
All of this, and we have not yet talked about the ambushes prepared in advance, where the resistance soldiers intensify the defense at a specific point to prevent the enemy from passing through it, so he is forced to change his route to another point that the resistance fighters intended to direct him to, because it was mined with explosive devices, or the resistance soldiers took positions. Excellent for hitting passing tanks at their weak points.
One of the most famous examples in this context is the ambushes prepared by the Chechens in advance in the war in 1994 and 1995 when the Russians entered Grozny, where the soldiers took dead positions in relation to tank shells and thus neutralized their power, showering the Russian soldiers with fire.
Likewise, the Al-Qassam Brigades were able, in more than one place, to drag Israeli forces to pre-prepared points and target their vehicles with missiles with greater ease. Examples of ambushes used by the Al-Qassam Brigades were booby-trapping an area in advance and blowing it up while military vehicles were passing by, and luring soldiers into a pre-prepared house and then showering it with bullets and missiles.
Hell on the ground of Gaza.
All of this comes with the support of an important weapon that frees resistance soldiers from the constraints of geography, which are the Gaza tunnels, which alone are considered one of the most powerful tools in this war. They are a complex network of tunnels with a number of entry and exit openings. Firstly, they represent an important tool for piercing the pincers manufactured by a state. The occupation around northern Gaza, thus supplying Al-Qassam soldiers with equipment remains possible even with the siege. Of course, the tunnels provide the advantage of safe movement for resistance soldiers, and most importantly of all, they can surprise the enemy and strike him with a fatal blow, giving him no chance of survival, escape, or confrontation.
In the end, just think about it. Even with the technical difference, the forces of the attacking occupying state must enter all buildings and rooms systematically to eliminate the Qassam threats. Therefore, the basic tactics of urban warfare (in any place) include searching each room separately, penetrating doors, and using combat techniques. From a close distance.
In this context, technology becomes completely restricted, and the soldier in armor must eventually reveal himself to face another soldier, and in a street that the Merkava cannot enter and which advanced marches cannot completely clear, the Qassamians get a largely equal battle, and they exploit it to strike the enemy militarily. And psychologically.
Hamas' strategic planners know that the battle is unequal and that the enemy is advanced technologically and in the number of soldiers and has stable supply lines, but the resistance soldiers are not fighting an ordinary battle, but rather an irregular war aimed at inflicting the greatest possible losses, and slowing the occupation's advance alone is considered a victory, because It greatly affects the political decision in Tel Aviv, and even the entire world’s view of the issue, which is becoming more clear day after day.
Source: Al Jazeera