jordan pulse -
The blood of the martyrs among the sons of this army is still beacons and witnesses of the heroism they recorded on the walls of Jerusalem, in Latrun, Bab al-Wad, al-Karamah, and in many places on the Arab land.” From the sayings of al-Hussein bin Talal, may God rest his soul.
Dignity is the song of the Arab victory
Jordan and its Arab nation live these days proudly of the memory of the eternal battle of dignity and its splendid glories, and we remember that military achievement and the prominent Arab victory, as we review the spotless page of dignity from the pages of the history of the Arab army, and we read travels from the glories of heroism for our valiant army in its battles that it fought during the years of the Arab conflict The Israeli, that is his honorable history, and he is defending the west of the river for the riches of Palestine and defending Al-Aqsa and the sanctities, the walls of Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Gate, the honorable rock, the cradle of Christ, the resurrection, Khalil Al-Rahman, and every grain of soil from the pure soil, and the soil of the Golan, and in many locations in the Arab world.
The geopolitical environment before the battle of dignity
The geopolitical environment that preceded the Battle of Karama can be summarized as follows:
A) After the end of the 1967 war:
Sharia (Jordan River) became the cease-fire line between Jordan and Israel, and the extension of Wadi Araba in the south to Aqaba, where the Jordanian forces were stationed on the longest cease-fire line during the Arab-Israeli conflict, with a length of approximately (480) km.
b) The areas adjacent to the cease-fire line were agricultural areas of the first degree, and orchards and orchards abound in them. A large area of land is planted with minefields (which were removed after the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel), as these fields were part of the Jordanian defense plan during that period, and the sites are still the same since the end of the Six-Day War in 1967 AD.
c) Jordan was responsible for supporting the fedayeen and allowing them to be present on its lands, and this is due to the independence of the Jordanian decision on the one hand, and on the other hand Jordan's reliance on its armed forces to protect and defend its lands against any threat, and that the battle of dignity did not take place suddenly, rather it was the period that preceded it And followed the war of 67 theaters of daily battles between the Arab army and the Israeli forces.
d) Israel was aware of the importance of the Jordanian role in the region, which was the spearhead of the national struggle during the conflict period, and accordingly it had ambitions and strategic goals that it was planning for, and waiting for opportunities to implement them against Jordan, as the prevailing atmosphere at that time was the best atmosphere, so the enemy seized it. A pretext and a cover for the implementation of these goals, such as the saying (destroying the commando bases in the Jordan Valley), as such a saying does not need this massive military build-up or that military movement as long as Israel has enough means and force multipliers to bomb and destroy the Jordan Valley without resorting to attacking it. Militarily, which was far beyond that pretext created by Israel to justify its military attack and aggression on Jordanian territory.
e) The political and military strategy adopted was to impose a fait accompli policy, and this requires action on the ground so that Israel can obtain an important card to negotiate politically in later stages, and what confirms the strategic goals, that process that was announced that it was Israel’s goals in restoring Draw its boundaries further than it is.
f) The positioning of the Arab Army forces on the central façade and on the most dangerous corridor that leads to the eastern heights, the heights of Naour and al-Salt, and thus to the center of gravity (Amman), was the basis of the defensive plan of the Arab Army forces on that corridor during the period preceding the battle, which includes the most dangerous Approaches that lead quickly and from the shortest path to critical and important goals.
Analysis of the important aspects of the battle of dignity
In order to find out the truth, any military analyst of the course of the Battle of Al-Karama must rule the military logic during the analysis, as that battle that the Arab army fought was not a limited operation against a single attack, in which a patrol carried out an armed raid on a specific target, but rather it was a large-scale battle that lasted for a period of Time is on a patch of land in which all weapons participated, and in order to understand the reality of that battle, the following important aspects of that battle must be analyzed.
a) Nature of battle:
The Battle of Al-Karama is considered one of the carefully planned military battles, due to the timing of the operation and the nature and type of weapons used in it, as maneuvering weapons of all kinds participated in it, in addition to the Air Force, during which all Jordanian weapons, led by the Royal Artillery Corps, played effective roles throughout the battle. In view of the timing of the battle, we find that the timing of the attack (zero hour) is a sure indication that the targets that were planned to be seized are crucial targets for the attacker, and the executing forces need a period of time to work before reaching and occupying them (and this strongly confirms the saying that the goal of the battle of dignity is only to destroy the bases of the fedayeen The Palestinians in the Jordan Valley) on the one hand, and on the other hand, the nature of the weapons participating in that battle from the Israeli side (all maneuvering weapons backed by support weapons and supported by the Air Force) confirms that the planner of that battle had built his plans on intelligence and security information that became evident through its presentation of the size of the forces The opposite Jordanian side, its armament, and the nature of its defense, which determined that plan to deploy this huge size of forces in order to achieve the element of surprise, and to perpetuate the acquisition of I have the element of initiation or initiative, to establish a bridge that allows the absorption of the rest of the forces designated for the attack in order to reach the desired final goals.
It confirms an indisputable fact that it is not possible for individuals (armed with light weapons to stand in front of this Israeli tide and the organized army armed with various types of weapons), if the momentum of the attack would not have been broken had it not been for the fact that the opposing force was large and organized, operating from defensive positions organized and planned according to the method The fixed defense, as the forces that crossed the river were contacted from the beginning and lured to between the Jordanian defensive lines on the battle front until the momentum of their attack was absorbed into the depth of the defensive positions that crossed the side of the main defensive position, where they fought a major battle in that. today.
b) The widening of the battle front:
The Battle of Al-Karama was not limited and aimed at achieving a temporary goal, as was rumored. Rather, it was a battle whose fronts extended from the Prince Muhammad Bridge in the north to the Prince Abdullah Bridge in the south in the Central Valleys, and in the south there was a misleading attack on the Ghor Al-Safi and Ghor Al-Mazraa regions.
By studying the battle front, we find that the Israeli attack was planned on more than one approach, which confirms the need for these approaches to absorb the attacking forces in a way that allows the delivery of the largest number of these forces of all types, armaments, and nature to the eastern bank in order to cause surprise and seize the initiative. In addition to the necessity of making a successful breach in more than one direction to be built upon and supported later in order to reach the final goal. Its defense is based on a series of defensive lines, starting from the river to the depth of the defensive area, which would not make penetration easy for the attacker, as he had imagined, especially since the battle came immediately after the 1967 war.
c) Battle objectives:
The final objectives of the battle that the Israelis had planned were not, as is rumored, (the destruction of commando bases in the Jordan Valley), as the battle of dignity had strategic and decisive Israeli objectives aimed at occupying the eastern mountain range in order to impose a fait accompli policy, and this is confirmed by the size of the forces that were mobilized for this The operation reached more than three military divisions, part of which crossed east of the river, and the rest of the forces were gathering in the depth of the central military zone and waiting for their turn to cross towards their objectives, as the attack plan map clearly showed the final objectives, and the military analyst when he saw these The targets can guess and estimate the size of the forces needed to carry out the attack on them, which is confirmed by the size of the forces that were actually mobilized in that battle, in addition to what was reported by news agencies at the time that the Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan instructed many journalists to prepare to attend his press conference that will be held in That afternoon in a certain part of the region, and this obsession would not have been overcome had it not been for the Arab army standing in the face of those attacking forces, as it fought as an organized, trained and armed army using what was available to it in the best way. avenues.
Battle objectives
a) Psychological goals:
1. Eliminating the forces of the Jordanian Arab Army before it could reorganize well after the June War.
2. Destroying the morale of the army and destabilizing the home front in Jordan.
B. Economic goals represented in striking the economic situation in the Jordan Valley, which is the main agricultural resource for the Kingdom, to become an unproductive land.
c) tactical objectives:
1. Occupying the eastern heights of the Jordan Valley as a dominant tactical area, not only tactical, but strategic, considering the area extending from the outskirts of Al-Salt to the eastern Jordanian border as largely exposed areas.
2. Stabilizing the Jordanian forces stationed in their various defensive positions by means of aerial bombardment, and striking the Arab resistance fighters in the town of Al-Karama.
d) Policy Objectives:
1. Occupying more Jordanian lands and bargaining over them.
2. Imposing its political conditions on Jordan.
The position of the two parties
a. The Jordanian forces, the 1st Infantry Division, were defending the central and southern regions, starting from Sail Zarqa, to Aqaba in the south, and were distributed as follows:
(1) The Hittin Brigade, occupying its defensive positions on the approach to Naour.
(2) The Princess Alia Brigade, which occupies defensive positions on the approaches to Wadi Shuaib.
(3) Al-Qadisiyah Brigade, occupying defensive positions on the approaches to Al-Aradah.
(4) The Prince Hassan bin Talal Armored Brigade / 60 supported the 1st Infantry Division, as its battalions were distributed among the aforementioned brigades and the reserve battalion.
(5) The division is supported by three field artillery battalions and an artillery company.
(6) The division is supported by a field engineering battalion.
(7) The Jordanian forces were psychologically prepared, they were warned, and all precautions were taken. They occupied defensive positions, coordinated well, inspected units, and completed deficiencies.
B. Enemy forces, consisting of the following:
(1) Bridgehead forces.
a. Armored Brigade / 7
B. Armored Brigade/60
c. Mechanized Infantry Brigade / 80
Dr.. Paratroopers company from the 35th Paratroopers Brigade
H. Five battalions of field and heavy artillery.
And the. Four squadrons of combat aircraft (Mirage, Mister).
g. A number of helicopters capable of transporting two paratrooper battalions.
(2) The main attack forces, consisting of an armored division and a mechanized infantry division, and their mustering area was in (Jericho) awaiting the success of Operation Bridgehead.
The plan of the parties
A) The Jordanian Forces Defense Plan:
The plan was for the 1st Infantry Division to defend the area of responsibility with three infantry brigades and two tank battalions as follows:
1) Hittin Brigade, defending the approaches to King Abdullah Naour Bridge - Amman - on the heights of Al-Kafrin.
2) Alia Brigade, defending the heights controlling Wadi Shuaib / Salt.
3) Al-Qadisiyah Brigade, defending the heights controlling the Al-Aridah Triangle.
4) A battalion of tanks is distributed at a company rate on every approach.
5) Reserve tank battalion.
6) Taking out veils the size of an infantry battalion and a tank company.
7) This plan is supported by three field artillery battalions to destroy enemy forces and prevent them from occupying the heights of Naour and Salt.
b) enemy plan:
After the June war in 1967, Israel relied on distributing its forces along the front on the principle of occupying deeply organized and fortified points and forward control by passing information on the loss and delay of any attacking forces, and the main forces occupy rear positions, throwing them at the appropriate time and place. follows:
1. Movement from the crowding area to the assembly area in Jericho.
2. The enemy divided its forces consisting of an armored division at the rate of a battle group on each approach, and kept the rest of the forces as a reserve to enhance success on any approach.
3. Starting the attack at (0530) on March 21, 1968 on three main approaches and a fourth deceptive approach to establish a foothold east of the river and up to the northern Shuna road and the Dead Sea, preceded by the landing of paratroopers in the town of Karama.
4. Developing the attack towards the planned targets, in order to occupy the heights of Salt and Naour, or one of them, by exploiting the success available to any of the approaches.
5. Supporting the enemy forces with fire from five artillery battalions and four squadrons of combat aircraft.
Fighting axes:
The enemy mobilized for the Battle of Al-Karama its best forces with training and combat experience. It used the 7th Armored Brigade, which had previously carried out the raid on Al-Samou’ village in 1966 AD, the 60th Armored Brigade, the 35th Paratroopers Brigade, the 80th Infantry Brigade, twenty helicopters to transport paratroopers, and five Artillery battalions (155 mm and 105 mm), in addition to his forces that were in contact with our forces along the cease-fire line, and his air force, which was in complete control of the sky and the battlefield, in addition to the attack force that he used in Ghor Al-Safi, which is a tank battalion and a battalion. Mechanized infantry, two companies of paratroopers, and an artillery battalion, all of these forces were mobilized in the Jericho area, and he pushed the bridgehead forces to areas close to the three main crossing sites, as he approached him at night.
The enemy began bombing the center on the warning and protection sites, then launched its major attack on the three bridges simultaneously, as it used to take the road that passes over these bridges and leads to the eastern bank, which is the road of Damia Bridge (Prince Muhammad) and leads to the Egyptian Triangle, then it branches off from it. Triangle Al-Ardah-Salt-Amman, Jericho Road, King Hussein Bridge-Shouna South, Wadi Shuaib-Salt-Amman, then Prince Abdullah Bridge (Sweimeh, Naour) Amman.
At dawn on March 21, 1968, the cannons roared, and the feet of the aggressors came close to the holy water of the river. Then, voices were heard on the air via wireless devices announcing the start of the Zionist attack across the river against the steadfast and stationary Jordanian army.
Fighting on the Prince Muhammad Bridge axis
The forces operating on this bridge rushed under heavy cover of artillery fire, tanks and medium machine guns, and the Hijab forces immediately east of the bridge confronted them, and a violent battle took place during which our forces managed to destroy a number of enemy tanks and force them to stop.
Then the enemy tried to establish two additional bridges, but the intensity of the artillery bombardment on the crossing sites, then repeated its rush again, and under the cover of air and artillery fire, but it also failed, and at noon it was ordered to withdraw and retreat west of the river, leaving many losses in lives and equipment.
Fighting on the King Hussein Bridge axis.
The enemy's main attack was directed towards the southern Shuna, and its main forces designated for the attack were concentrated on this axis from which it could be diverted to the town of Karama, Al-Rama and Al-Kafrin in the south, and the enemy used in this battle two brigades (armor brigade and mechanized brigade) backed by artillery and aircraft.
On the morning of Thursday, March 21, the enemy pushed a group of tanks towards crossing the bridge, and clashed with the Hijab forces near the bridge, but the shield snipers were able to destroy that group. Continuous artillery contributed to limiting its momentum, but the enemy pushed back other groups of its shields and infantry, after bitter fighting, this force was able to overcome the forces of Hijab and then bypassed them, and reached the outskirts of the town of Karama from the south and west side, destroying all buildings in the places of its advance.
The enemy was able to land the first wave of paratroopers east of Al-Karamah, but this wave incurred great losses in lives and thwarted it, which prompted the enemy to land another wave, the latter managed to reach the town of Al-Karamah, and began destroying the town's buildings, and clashed with some soldiers, residents, and the resistance in fighting Inside the buildings, and in the meantime, the enemy continued its attempts to attack the southern town of Shuna, and our forces confronted it every time, and expected more losses, and when the battle intensified, the enemy demanded, for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a cease-fire, but His Majesty the Supreme Commander For the armed forces, Hussein bin Talal - may God rest his soul in peace - ordered the continuation of the fighting until the last Israeli soldier left the battlefield, and the enemy tried to withdraw, but our forces intervened in the withdrawal process, and turned it into an unorganized withdrawal, so the enemy left a number of his vehicles and killed him on the battlefield.
Fighting on the Prince Abdullah Bridge axis
The enemy tried to make a crossing from this axis towards Naour-Amman, and mobilized armored forces for this duty, but it failed from the beginning on this axis, and its forces were unable to cross the river after destroying most of the bridging equipment that the enemy tried to use in the crossing process.
In a miserable attempt by the enemy to deal with the situation, he separated a combat group from his forces operating on the approach to Wadi Shuaib and pushed them to the Ramah triangle behind the Hijab force operating east of the bridge to besiege it, but it fell into siege and was subjected to heavy bombardment that led to the destruction of a large number of its vehicles.
The fighting on this approach ended with the chaotic withdrawal of the enemy forces, and the resistance of our forces with artillery, tank fire, and anti-armor weapons had the greatest effect in stopping the enemy's progress and thus defeating and losing it.
Ghor Al-Safi axis.
The enemy tried hard to distract the Jordanian forces as much as possible, terrorize the residents of the area, and destroy its facilities, which led it to attack the approaching Ghor Al-Safi Bartel from its tanks and motorized infantry, paving the way for that with a psychological advertising campaign using leaflets that it delivered to the population calling on them to surrender and not resist. He also carried out intensive aerial bombardment operations on our forces, but all of this was met with violent resistance, and therefore he was forced to withdraw, and so the enemy completely failed in this battle without achieving any of its goals on all approaches, and he came out of this battle as a material and moral loser, a loss that he did not expect. never.
The Israeli orders were issued to withdraw at around 1500 hours after His Majesty King Hussein, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces at the time, rejected the cease-fire, who personally supervised and led the battle, and inspired enthusiasm among his soldiers and forces, and with his determination and strong will he was a wonderful example from which everyone learned how Strong free will is above all else.
The withdrawal process took nine hours due to the difficulty the Israelis had to retreat due to the concentrated bombardment by our forces.
d) Control of bridges
The Royal Armor Corps and Artillery played a major role in the Battle of Al-Karama and along the front, especially in controlling the crossing bridges, and this confirms the inability of the Israeli army to push any new forces to support its attack, which it started, due to their inability to control the bridges during the hours of the battle. This led the attacking Israeli forces to lose the element of surprise, and thus the initiative, and contributed greatly to reducing the momentum of the attack and isolating the attacking forces east of the river, in an easy way to deal with and destroy them, and the role of artillery and armor continued to be decisive throughout the battle by depriving the Israelis of bridging or trying to rebuild On the old bridges, until the end of the battle, confirms that the Arab army fought the battle of dignity with confidence in itself, and that the effort that was made was a fierce defensive effort planned by focusing on the most important points of the fighting for the attacking forces in order to break their momentum and slow the speed of their attack.
e) The timing of the start of the battle of the Arab army
The Arab army began fighting after five hours had passed, and given the short approaches of the attack, it quickly led to decisive targets (the center of gravity), so the period of five hours is sufficient for those forces to reach their goals, especially in light of the size of the forces that were pushed, their nature, speed and momentum of their attack, and on the other hand The role of all Jordanian weapons, especially artillery, must be absent for five and a half hours, and this is sufficient to enable the Israeli forces to cross and according to the approaches designated for them, as they do not need to build bridges or cordons, because some bridges already exist, except what contradicts this saying from its foundation is the lack of The ability of the Israelis to support their forces east of the river, and they tried haphazardly to rebuild on the previous bridges, and they also tried to build iron bridges in order to perpetuate the momentum of the attack and maintain the initiative, but the Jordanian forces, from the first moment of the attack, missed the opportunity and deprived them of it, and this is evidence that the Israeli forces The forces that integrated east of the river were the size of a squad, which crossed from the first hour, and were drawn into the depth of the defensive positions, breaking the intensity of their attack, and after that, the Israeli forces were unable to push any new forces east of the river. R, which confused her and increased her bewilderment, especially in light of the ferocity of the defensive positions and the fierce resistance that they faced, and the armed forces used all short-range weapons and cold weapons in their fighting with the attacking Israeli forces in Al-Shuna.
f) Request a cease-fire.
Israel resorted to a cease-fire at eleven o'clock, and this is great evidence that the Arab army forces that it faced in the defensive positions were as great as the challenge, and the battle for them was a battle of existence on the military level, but on the political level, Jordan insisted, and in the words of His Majesty King Hussein - May God rest his soul in peace - on the non-cessation of fire as long as there is an Israeli soldier east of the river, and this is sufficient to ward off the injustice that many unleashed on Jordan, its leadership, its people and its army and in an effort to make that battle possible, as how can those who do not control the battle, and control all its course, control the decision of a cease-fire This proves, without the slightest doubt, that the battle of dignity was the battle of the Arab army from the first moment, as its supreme command was managing it and following its course moment by moment, and that His Majesty the King's refusal to accept the cease-fire is evidence of the command's ownership and control over its course. When linking this paragraph with the previous one The saying that the Arab army entered the battle within five hours confirms the lie of the saying, and contradicts it from its foundation, as how can Israel ask for a cease-fire, when until then it did not meet the Arab army that planned its battle on the basis of assessing its capabilities And how could a country whose forces did not participate until that alleged time in the battle ask for a cease-fire had it not been in its midst since its first spark, and fully aware of how the battle is proceeding moment by moment, and how its forces are firmly controlling it, and that its supreme leadership was It sees the audacious victory soon, and it requires the patience of an hour, especially when this leadership aborted and missed the opportunity for the enemy to refuse to cease fire, as it saw with its insight and skill what the Israelis were planning in their attempt to stop the fighting without reaching the inevitable results that they see with certainty that victory is in This battle they had missed, and it had become undoubtedly in the hands of the Arab army.
In the longer term, the insightful leadership confirms from the outset that the issue of sovereignty was settled on Jordanian territory, as Israel can only request a cease-fire from a counter-sovereign side that has a sovereign and political decision on the ground, which certainly denies what some have said. In an attempt to make light of that battle, and obscure the role of the Arab Army in it, one of the enemy leaders mentioned, saying (All my tanks were hit on Jordanian soil except for two).
g) The Israeli landing in the town of Al-Karama.
The landing operation carried out by the Israeli forces east of the town of Al-Karamah was aimed at relieving the pressure on their forces that crossed east of the river, in addition to destroying the town of Al-Karamah, especially when they were unable to send any new forces across the bridges, due to their destruction by the Royal Artillery Corps, which clearly indicates He emphasized that the defensive plans through which the Arab Army forces fought their defensive battle were solid, and the dense and accurate artillery support, along with the steadfastness of the soldiers in the defensive positions and their depth, contributed to their success.
Battle results
a. The battle of dignity was a turning point in the modern history of the Arab nation, and in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, where the enemy demanded, for the first time, a cease-fire, and after the battle of dignity, the enemy refused to fight any battle with ground forces, and its battles were limited to air and artillery bombardment, and the use of mobile forces by air and landing in remote and isolated places, and destroying some bridges.
B. On the political level, Israel suffered a great loss, and was branded with aggression, and a large part of public opinion shifted to the Arab interest, and waves of discontent appeared among Israel's internal, official and popular circles.
c. On the economic level, Israel's losses were estimated in the millions, as it used weapons equivalent to a squad of shields, artillery, and infantry, and a huge number of air sorties, which cost exorbitant expenses and prevented the achievement of any significant goals.
Dr.. On the psychological level, the enemy failed to achieve its goal of destroying the will of the army and the Jordanian people. Rather, the result was the opposite, as the morale of the Jordanian army and the people in Jordan increased, and the enemy failed to maintain the morale of its forces, which are accustomed to seeing themselves always victorious, and thus shattered the myth of the army that does not He conquers.
H. (losses of both parties)
Our valiant forces:
88 martyrs, 108 wounded, 13 tanks and 39 different vehicles destroyed.
Enemy forces:
250 dead, 450 wounded, 88 different vehicles were destroyed, including 47 tanks, 18 tankers, 24 armed cars, 19 cargo cars, and 7 combat aircraft were shot down.
PETRA