jordan pulse -

Prof. Ali Hayasat

Since the establishment of Israel, Jordan’s national security equation has posed a constant challenge for decision-makers in Amman. For decades, Jordanian strategy rested on two complementary pillars: a minimum framework of Arab collective security, and active diplomacy that cultivated deep ties with key Western capitals, in an effort to balance geographic pressures with the state’s supreme interests.

Over time, however, the “Arab security option” collapsed. First came Egypt’s withdrawal from the confrontation front after Camp David, followed by Iraq’s exit from the Arab equation after the 1990 Kuwait invasion, the ensuing sanctions, and eventual disintegration. These developments effectively dismantled the very idea of Arab joint defense, leaving Jordan exposed to shifting regional currents and forcing it to seek alternative paths to safeguard its security and stability.

Jordan’s policy shifted toward new regional and international alliances, crystallized in the 1993 Oslo Accords and the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty. Since then, the state restructured its defense priorities: compulsory military service was abolished, and focus turned to developing internal security capabilities—most notably through the establishment of the Gendarmerie. This was part of a broader strategic transformation aimed at bolstering domestic stability while avoiding open-ended external conflicts or reckless adventures.

Today, with the rise of Israel’s far-right, popular calls are resurfacing in Jordan for the return of compulsory service, even for arming civilians in preparation for potential threats. While such appeals stem from genuine patriotic concern, they also reflect an incomplete reading of the complex security and political landscape. Deterrence cannot be reduced to arming the populace, nor can the new nature of threats—largely nontraditional—be ignored.

It is true that Israel exerts increasing pressure on Jordan regarding sensitive issues such as the Hashemite custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy sites and the question of displacement in the West Bank. Yet under current regional and international balances, Israel neither has the capacity nor the audacity to open a military front across the Jordan River. A direct confrontation would serve no party’s interest, and could ignite a fire that no one could contain. The situation recalls an anecdote from Egypt’s leadership council in June 1967: when President Sadat suggested arming civilians to defend Cairo after the fall of Sinai, the rest of the council mocked him for misunderstanding the geopolitical and military realities of the conflict.

As the Jordanian proverb says: “Fodder at the raid is useless.” Preparation must begin in times of peace, not at the moment of crisis. National security is not built as a reaction, but as a long-term process of strategic deterrence, institutional efficiency, and fostering public awareness attuned to evolving challenges.

Calls to arm the populace, though patriotic in sentiment, overlook the deeper nature of today’s strategic struggle. The real battle is one of awareness and preparedness—not emotion and weaponry.