Hormuz, the Nuclear File, and the South: The Iranian–Lebanese Triangle of Deterrence in Confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv

Ahmad Abdelbaset Rjoub

Researcher and strategic planner

The Changing Regional Landscape

Amid the profound transformations taking place across the Middle East, the cards of regional powers are becoming increasingly intertwined in a complex equation that combines negotiation and deterrence. While Iran possesses strategic leverage through its control over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, Lebanon, through Hezbollah's weapons, holds a unique pressure card that grants it indirect bargaining power with the U.S. administration and the Israeli state. This article analyzes the dynamics of power and presents a vision for the Lebanese state to utilize the resistance's weapons as a genuine bargaining tool in exchange for ending aggression and securing Israeli withdrawal.

First: Comparing Iran’s Negotiating Power – The Hormuz Card versus the Nuclear Card

Iran possesses two strategic instruments that differ in both their impact and deterrence timelines. The first is the Strait of Hormuz card. Approximately 20% of the world's oil passes through this waterway, giving Tehran the ability to exert rapid geopolitical pressure. Any Iranian threat to close the strait can drive up global energy prices and harm Western economies. However, the weakness of this card lies in the fact that the United States possesses military capabilities capable of breaking such a blockade, albeit at considerable economic and political cost. This card is primarily useful for tactical deterrence and short-term direct pressure.

The second card is Iran's nuclear capability, which provides Tehran with long-term strategic deterrence. Approaching a nuclear threshold—even without possessing an actual weapon—gives Iran leverage in major negotiations with world powers and serves as a guarantee for regime survival against potential regime-change scenarios. The cost of this card is extremely high in terms of severe sanctions, but its negotiating impact is far greater than that of the Hormuz card. In summary, Iran is strongest when it combines both cards: Hormuz for immediate economic pressure and the nuclear program for strategic guarantees. In current negotiations, Tehran is using this combination to secure an agreement that does not undermine the structure of the regime.

Second: Redefining Hezbollah’s Weapons – From a Domestic Controversy to a National Negotiating Asset

Hezbollah's weapons are often portrayed in Western discourse as a Lebanese domestic problem. However, a strategic reading offers a different understanding: these weapons represent Lebanon's only leverage capable of creating a real balance with Israel. Through them, southern Lebanon was liberated in 2000, Israel's objectives in the 2006 war were frustrated, and ongoing attacks are currently being deterred. The mistake made by some Lebanese actors is treating these weapons as a burden, whereas the strategic approach is to employ them as a negotiating tool.

How can the Lebanese state insist on retaining Hezbollah's weapons in exchange for Israeli withdrawal and an end to hostilities? First, the Lebanese government should adopt an official position stating: 'The resistance's weapons are not negotiable within any normalization framework; they are part of the national defense strategy.' Second, a clear strategic linkage must be established: Israel's complete withdrawal from all Lebanese territories (Northern Ghajar, the Shebaa Farms, and the Kfar Shouba Hills), along with an end to land, sea, and air attacks, should be a prerequisite for any discussion concerning the future of the weapons. Third, a transitional defense vision can be presented: as long as occupation persists, the weapons remain necessary; once occupation ends and the state acquires genuine deterrent capabilities through a national army supported regionally, resistance forces can be integrated into a unified national defense system.

Third: Applying Pressure on the U.S. Administration – Practical Steps for the Lebanese State

To transform the resistance's weapons into a genuine bargaining chip, a sequence of measures can be proposed. First, a national consensus position should be declared affirming that the resistance's weapons are a sovereign asset that cannot be compromised under pressure. Second, Israeli withdrawal should be made a condition for any negotiations concerning the weapons, thereby redirecting American pressure toward Israel. Third, Lebanon should capitalize on emerging regional understandings among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to strengthen its position and mitigate American pressure. Fourth, any discussion of disarmament should be linked to comprehensive security arrangements that include international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, enabling them to protect national borders effectively. Fifth, any positive development in Iran's nuclear negotiations should be leveraged as regional cover for maneuvering within the framework of a broader settlement.

Fourth: What Do the United States and Israel Want – and How Should Lebanon Respond?

Based on current developments, recent U.S. pressure—including sanctions on figures associated with Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, the Lebanese Army, and the Iranian ambassador—appears to go beyond disarmament and seeks to dismantle the entire military, political, and financial structure. The broader American strategic objective is to eliminate the resistance model as a regional instrument, separate Lebanon from the Iranian axis, and move it toward normalization.

However, Lebanon's strengths lie in the fact that Hezbollah's weapons have become integrated into the country's social and military fabric, making their removal difficult without triggering civil conflict or instability—an outcome that the United States itself seeks to avoid. Furthermore, any large-scale Israeli military action would likely face a significant response that increases the cost of escalation. Despite internal divisions, much of Lebanese society rejects direct Israeli dominance.

Accordingly, a clear message can be directed to the U.S. administration: You are demanding the abandonment of the resistance's weapons, but we maintain that these weapons have protected Lebanon from collapse. If you seek their removal, then you must first ensure Israel's complete withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, secure a permanent end to hostilities, provide written American guarantees against future threats, and support a comprehensive plan to strengthen the Lebanese Army. Only then can discussions begin regarding the future of the weapons within a unified national defense framework. Otherwise, pressure and sanctions will only produce greater rigidity and instability, outcomes that do not serve American interests.

Fifth: Betting on Iran–U.S. Negotiations and Future Options

Part of Hezbollah's calculations is linked to the outcome of negotiations between Iran and the United States. If Tehran emerges from these talks with a strong position that preserves its nuclear capabilities, Lebanon could benefit because it would signal a relative American retreat in the region. Conversely, if Iran makes major concessions without securing strategic gains, Hezbollah's regional backing could weaken.

The recommendation for Lebanon is not to place all its bets on Iranian negotiations but rather to build alternative regional partnerships—with countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—to greater room for maneuver.

Lebanon faces three possible paths. The first is to yield to pressure and dismantle the weapons unilaterally, which could lead to national collapse and Israeli dominance. The second is to retain the weapons without employing them as a negotiating tool, resulting in continued sanctions and gradual state erosion. The third—and, in this analysis, the preferred option—is the intelligent use of the weapons as a bargaining instrument, transforming them from a burden into leverage for securing Israeli withdrawal and American guarantees while implementing a transitional plan to strengthen the Lebanese Army. This path alone, according to this perspective, can protect Lebanese sovereignty while avoiding internal conflict and regional war.

Conclusion

A strong Lebanese state is one that retains all of its sources of strength rather than abandoning them to satisfy Washington. The resistance's weapons are not a liability; they constitute the only source of leverage that compels Israel to think carefully before undertaking military action. The Lebanese government should utilize them as a genuine bargaining tool and state clearly to the U.S. administration: 'No comprehensive Israeli withdrawal, no discussion of the weapons.' Only then, according to this view, can American pressure be transformed into a historic opportunity to liberate territory and protect the state.

Hormuz, the Nuclear File, and the South: The Iranian–Lebanese Triangle of Deterrence in Confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv

Ahmad Abdelbaset Rjoub

Researcher and strategic planner

The Changing Regional Landscape

Amid the profound transformations taking place across the Middle East, the cards of regional powers are becoming increasingly intertwined in a complex equation that combines negotiation and deterrence. While Iran possesses strategic leverage through its control over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, Lebanon, through Hezbollah's weapons, holds a unique pressure card that grants it indirect bargaining power with the U.S. administration and the Israeli state. This article analyzes the dynamics of power and presents a vision for the Lebanese state to utilize the resistance's weapons as a genuine bargaining tool in exchange for ending aggression and securing Israeli withdrawal.

First: Comparing Iran’s Negotiating Power – The Hormuz Card versus the Nuclear Card

Iran possesses two strategic instruments that differ in both their impact and deterrence timelines. The first is the Strait of Hormuz card. Approximately 20% of the world's oil passes through this waterway, giving Tehran the ability to exert rapid geopolitical pressure. Any Iranian threat to close the strait can drive up global energy prices and harm Western economies. However, the weakness of this card lies in the fact that the United States possesses military capabilities capable of breaking such a blockade, albeit at considerable economic and political cost. This card is primarily useful for tactical deterrence and short-term direct pressure.

The second card is Iran's nuclear capability, which provides Tehran with long-term strategic deterrence. Approaching a nuclear threshold—even without possessing an actual weapon—gives Iran leverage in major negotiations with world powers and serves as a guarantee for regime survival against potential regime-change scenarios. The cost of this card is extremely high in terms of severe sanctions, but its negotiating impact is far greater than that of the Hormuz card. In summary, Iran is strongest when it combines both cards: Hormuz for immediate economic pressure and the nuclear program for strategic guarantees. In current negotiations, Tehran is using this combination to secure an agreement that does not undermine the structure of the regime.

Second: Redefining Hezbollah’s Weapons – From a Domestic Controversy to a National Negotiating Asset

Hezbollah's weapons are often portrayed in Western discourse as a Lebanese domestic problem. However, a strategic reading offers a different understanding: these weapons represent Lebanon's only leverage capable of creating a real balance with Israel. Through them, southern Lebanon was liberated in 2000, Israel's objectives in the 2006 war were frustrated, and ongoing attacks are currently being deterred. The mistake made by some Lebanese actors is treating these weapons as a burden, whereas the strategic approach is to employ them as a negotiating tool.

How can the Lebanese state insist on retaining Hezbollah's weapons in exchange for Israeli withdrawal and an end to hostilities? First, the Lebanese government should adopt an official position stating: 'The resistance's weapons are not negotiable within any normalization framework; they are part of the national defense strategy.' Second, a clear strategic linkage must be established: Israel's complete withdrawal from all Lebanese territories (Northern Ghajar, the Shebaa Farms, and the Kfar Shouba Hills), along with an end to land, sea, and air attacks, should be a prerequisite for any discussion concerning the future of the weapons. Third, a transitional defense vision can be presented: as long as occupation persists, the weapons remain necessary; once occupation ends and the state acquires genuine deterrent capabilities through a national army supported regionally, resistance forces can be integrated into a unified national defense system.

Third: Applying Pressure on the U.S. Administration – Practical Steps for the Lebanese State

To transform the resistance's weapons into a genuine bargaining chip, a sequence of measures can be proposed. First, a national consensus position should be declared affirming that the resistance's weapons are a sovereign asset that cannot be compromised under pressure. Second, Israeli withdrawal should be made a condition for any negotiations concerning the weapons, thereby redirecting American pressure toward Israel. Third, Lebanon should capitalize on emerging regional understandings among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to strengthen its position and mitigate American pressure. Fourth, any discussion of disarmament should be linked to comprehensive security arrangements that include international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, enabling them to protect national borders effectively. Fifth, any positive development in Iran's nuclear negotiations should be leveraged as regional cover for maneuvering within the framework of a broader settlement.

Fourth: What Do the United States and Israel Want – and How Should Lebanon Respond?

Based on current developments, recent U.S. pressure—including sanctions on figures associated with Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, the Lebanese Army, and the Iranian ambassador—appears to go beyond disarmament and seeks to dismantle the entire military, political, and financial structure. The broader American strategic objective is to eliminate the resistance model as a regional instrument, separate Lebanon from the Iranian axis, and move it toward normalization.

However, Lebanon's strengths lie in the fact that Hezbollah's weapons have become integrated into the country's social and military fabric, making their removal difficult without triggering civil conflict or instability—an outcome that the United States itself seeks to avoid. Furthermore, any large-scale Israeli military action would likely face a significant response that increases the cost of escalation. Despite internal divisions, much of Lebanese society rejects direct Israeli dominance.

Accordingly, a clear message can be directed to the U.S. administration: You are demanding the abandonment of the resistance's weapons, but we maintain that these weapons have protected Lebanon from collapse. If you seek their removal, then you must first ensure Israel's complete withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, secure a permanent end to hostilities, provide written American guarantees against future threats, and support a comprehensive plan to strengthen the Lebanese Army. Only then can discussions begin regarding the future of the weapons within a unified national defense framework. Otherwise, pressure and sanctions will only produce greater rigidity and instability, outcomes that do not serve American interests.

Fifth: Betting on Iran–U.S. Negotiations and Future Options

Part of Hezbollah's calculations is linked to the outcome of negotiations between Iran and the United States. If Tehran emerges from these talks with a strong position that preserves its nuclear capabilities, Lebanon could benefit because it would signal a relative American retreat in the region. Conversely, if Iran makes major concessions without securing strategic gains, Hezbollah's regional backing could weaken.

The recommendation for Lebanon is not to place all its bets on Iranian negotiations but rather to build alternative regional partnerships—with countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—to greater room for maneuver.

Lebanon faces three possible paths. The first is to yield to pressure and dismantle the weapons unilaterally, which could lead to national collapse and Israeli dominance. The second is to retain the weapons without employing them as a negotiating tool, resulting in continued sanctions and gradual state erosion. The third—and, in this analysis, the preferred option—is the intelligent use of the weapons as a bargaining instrument, transforming them from a burden into leverage for securing Israeli withdrawal and American guarantees while implementing a transitional plan to strengthen the Lebanese Army. This path alone, according to this perspective, can protect Lebanese sovereignty while avoiding internal conflict and regional war.

Conclusion

A strong Lebanese state is one that retains all of its sources of strength rather than abandoning them to satisfy Washington. The resistance's weapons are not a liability; they constitute the only source of leverage that compels Israel to think carefully before undertaking military action. The Lebanese government should utilize them as a genuine bargaining tool and state clearly to the U.S. administration: 'No comprehensive Israeli withdrawal, no discussion of the weapons.' Only then, according to this view, can American pressure be transformed into a historic opportunity to liberate territory and protect the state.