AMMAN June 2 2026: A new scientific paper prepared by future studies expert, Dr. Walid Abdel-Hay, concluded that the most likely scenario for the future of the Iranian nuclear program in the coming years is Iran's continuation as a 'nuclear threshold state'. This status allows Iran to retain the capability for a rapid transition toward producing nuclear weapons without officially declaring their possession. The paper, issued by the Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, provides an in-depth forward-looking analysis of one of the most sensitive files in the Middle East. It balances four potential scenarios for its path until 2030 through a historical, technical, and strategic analysis of the Iranian nuclear program. The study notes that since 1945, the world has known only nine nuclear states: the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. It states that the pace of nuclear proliferation practically halted after North Korea announced its possession of nuclear weapons in 2006, as no new country has joined the nuclear club in nearly twenty years. The paper draws attention to the fact that the expansion of global reliance on nuclear energy opens the door for the growing possibilities of 'militarizing' civilian nuclear programs, especially among countries that possess technical capabilities and feel increasing security threats, making the Iranian case a prominent model for this trend. The study reviews the roots of the Iranian nuclear program, noting that the United States itself supported the Iranian nuclear project during the Shah's era within the 'Atoms for Peace' initiative, before the American stance shifted radically after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It also stops at the shifts the program witnessed since the discovery of the Natanz and Arak facilities at the beginning of the new millennium, passing through international sanctions and the 2015 nuclear agreement, up to the withdrawal of President Donald Trump's administration from the agreement in 2018 and the subsequent acceleration of Iranian enrichment processes. In a notable critique of the political and media discourse surrounding the nuclear file, the paper confirms that the repeated predictions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding Iran's imminent possession of a nuclear bomb over the past three decades have all failed, making them closer to propaganda estimates than scientific ones. The study builds its future analysis on four main scenarios: dismantling the nuclear program, continuing in the 'nuclear threshold' status, transitioning to producing nuclear weapons, and the 'Black Swan' scenario, which assumes the occurrence of exceptional, high-impact, low-probability events. The paper sees that the scenario of dismantling the Iranian program is the least likely, with its chances of realization not exceeding 5% to 10%, given the heavy political and strategic costs that would result from Tehran retreating from a project in which it has invested massive resources over decades. As for the scenario of Iran declaring its possession of nuclear weapons and officially joining the nuclear club, the study estimates its probability between 35% and 40%. It views that its chances are linked to increased external security pressures and threats, the rise of the hardline current within the Iranian regime, and the growing influence of the Revolutionary Guard. In contrast, the study suggests that Iran is 60% to 65% likely to remain within the 'nuclear threshold' status. This position allows it to retain the infrastructure, materials, and expertise necessary to produce a nuclear weapon within a short period, without crossing the political and legal line of actually declaring its possession. The paper also addresses an American model for measuring the Iranian threat known as the 'Geiger Counter for the Iranian Threat,' which gave Iran 157 points out of 180, equivalent to 87.2% of the maximum threat level. However, the researcher warns against exaggerating the accuracy of this model due to its partial reliance on political and intelligence estimates that may be affected by institutional biases. The study concludes that the future of the Iranian nuclear program will remain governed by a precise equation combining strategic ambiguity and potential deterrence. It suggests that Tehran will continue to hint at the possibility of transitioning to producing a nuclear bomb without taking a final step in this direction, unless it faces severe security threats that push it to cross the current enrichment threshold and transition toward nuclear weapon production levels. The paper emphasizes that the decisive factor in determining the final path of the program will not be technical alone, but will also be influenced by the future of the Iranian regime, the nature of the American role in the Middle East, the positions of major powers, and the level of escalation between Iran and its regional and international opponents in the coming years.
AMMAN June 2 2026: A new scientific paper prepared by future studies expert, Dr. Walid Abdel-Hay, concluded that the most likely scenario for the future of the Iranian nuclear program in the coming years is Iran's continuation as a 'nuclear threshold state'. This status allows Iran to retain the capability for a rapid transition toward producing nuclear weapons without officially declaring their possession. The paper, issued by the Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, provides an in-depth forward-looking analysis of one of the most sensitive files in the Middle East. It balances four potential scenarios for its path until 2030 through a historical, technical, and strategic analysis of the Iranian nuclear program. The study notes that since 1945, the world has known only nine nuclear states: the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. It states that the pace of nuclear proliferation practically halted after North Korea announced its possession of nuclear weapons in 2006, as no new country has joined the nuclear club in nearly twenty years. The paper draws attention to the fact that the expansion of global reliance on nuclear energy opens the door for the growing possibilities of 'militarizing' civilian nuclear programs, especially among countries that possess technical capabilities and feel increasing security threats, making the Iranian case a prominent model for this trend. The study reviews the roots of the Iranian nuclear program, noting that the United States itself supported the Iranian nuclear project during the Shah's era within the 'Atoms for Peace' initiative, before the American stance shifted radically after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It also stops at the shifts the program witnessed since the discovery of the Natanz and Arak facilities at the beginning of the new millennium, passing through international sanctions and the 2015 nuclear agreement, up to the withdrawal of President Donald Trump's administration from the agreement in 2018 and the subsequent acceleration of Iranian enrichment processes. In a notable critique of the political and media discourse surrounding the nuclear file, the paper confirms that the repeated predictions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding Iran's imminent possession of a nuclear bomb over the past three decades have all failed, making them closer to propaganda estimates than scientific ones. The study builds its future analysis on four main scenarios: dismantling the nuclear program, continuing in the 'nuclear threshold' status, transitioning to producing nuclear weapons, and the 'Black Swan' scenario, which assumes the occurrence of exceptional, high-impact, low-probability events. The paper sees that the scenario of dismantling the Iranian program is the least likely, with its chances of realization not exceeding 5% to 10%, given the heavy political and strategic costs that would result from Tehran retreating from a project in which it has invested massive resources over decades. As for the scenario of Iran declaring its possession of nuclear weapons and officially joining the nuclear club, the study estimates its probability between 35% and 40%. It views that its chances are linked to increased external security pressures and threats, the rise of the hardline current within the Iranian regime, and the growing influence of the Revolutionary Guard. In contrast, the study suggests that Iran is 60% to 65% likely to remain within the 'nuclear threshold' status. This position allows it to retain the infrastructure, materials, and expertise necessary to produce a nuclear weapon within a short period, without crossing the political and legal line of actually declaring its possession. The paper also addresses an American model for measuring the Iranian threat known as the 'Geiger Counter for the Iranian Threat,' which gave Iran 157 points out of 180, equivalent to 87.2% of the maximum threat level. However, the researcher warns against exaggerating the accuracy of this model due to its partial reliance on political and intelligence estimates that may be affected by institutional biases. The study concludes that the future of the Iranian nuclear program will remain governed by a precise equation combining strategic ambiguity and potential deterrence. It suggests that Tehran will continue to hint at the possibility of transitioning to producing a nuclear bomb without taking a final step in this direction, unless it faces severe security threats that push it to cross the current enrichment threshold and transition toward nuclear weapon production levels. The paper emphasizes that the decisive factor in determining the final path of the program will not be technical alone, but will also be influenced by the future of the Iranian regime, the nature of the American role in the Middle East, the positions of major powers, and the level of escalation between Iran and its regional and international opponents in the coming years.
AMMAN June 2 2026: A new scientific paper prepared by future studies expert, Dr. Walid Abdel-Hay, concluded that the most likely scenario for the future of the Iranian nuclear program in the coming years is Iran's continuation as a 'nuclear threshold state'. This status allows Iran to retain the capability for a rapid transition toward producing nuclear weapons without officially declaring their possession. The paper, issued by the Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, provides an in-depth forward-looking analysis of one of the most sensitive files in the Middle East. It balances four potential scenarios for its path until 2030 through a historical, technical, and strategic analysis of the Iranian nuclear program. The study notes that since 1945, the world has known only nine nuclear states: the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. It states that the pace of nuclear proliferation practically halted after North Korea announced its possession of nuclear weapons in 2006, as no new country has joined the nuclear club in nearly twenty years. The paper draws attention to the fact that the expansion of global reliance on nuclear energy opens the door for the growing possibilities of 'militarizing' civilian nuclear programs, especially among countries that possess technical capabilities and feel increasing security threats, making the Iranian case a prominent model for this trend. The study reviews the roots of the Iranian nuclear program, noting that the United States itself supported the Iranian nuclear project during the Shah's era within the 'Atoms for Peace' initiative, before the American stance shifted radically after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It also stops at the shifts the program witnessed since the discovery of the Natanz and Arak facilities at the beginning of the new millennium, passing through international sanctions and the 2015 nuclear agreement, up to the withdrawal of President Donald Trump's administration from the agreement in 2018 and the subsequent acceleration of Iranian enrichment processes. In a notable critique of the political and media discourse surrounding the nuclear file, the paper confirms that the repeated predictions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding Iran's imminent possession of a nuclear bomb over the past three decades have all failed, making them closer to propaganda estimates than scientific ones. The study builds its future analysis on four main scenarios: dismantling the nuclear program, continuing in the 'nuclear threshold' status, transitioning to producing nuclear weapons, and the 'Black Swan' scenario, which assumes the occurrence of exceptional, high-impact, low-probability events. The paper sees that the scenario of dismantling the Iranian program is the least likely, with its chances of realization not exceeding 5% to 10%, given the heavy political and strategic costs that would result from Tehran retreating from a project in which it has invested massive resources over decades. As for the scenario of Iran declaring its possession of nuclear weapons and officially joining the nuclear club, the study estimates its probability between 35% and 40%. It views that its chances are linked to increased external security pressures and threats, the rise of the hardline current within the Iranian regime, and the growing influence of the Revolutionary Guard. In contrast, the study suggests that Iran is 60% to 65% likely to remain within the 'nuclear threshold' status. This position allows it to retain the infrastructure, materials, and expertise necessary to produce a nuclear weapon within a short period, without crossing the political and legal line of actually declaring its possession. The paper also addresses an American model for measuring the Iranian threat known as the 'Geiger Counter for the Iranian Threat,' which gave Iran 157 points out of 180, equivalent to 87.2% of the maximum threat level. However, the researcher warns against exaggerating the accuracy of this model due to its partial reliance on political and intelligence estimates that may be affected by institutional biases. The study concludes that the future of the Iranian nuclear program will remain governed by a precise equation combining strategic ambiguity and potential deterrence. It suggests that Tehran will continue to hint at the possibility of transitioning to producing a nuclear bomb without taking a final step in this direction, unless it faces severe security threats that push it to cross the current enrichment threshold and transition toward nuclear weapon production levels. The paper emphasizes that the decisive factor in determining the final path of the program will not be technical alone, but will also be influenced by the future of the Iranian regime, the nature of the American role in the Middle East, the positions of major powers, and the level of escalation between Iran and its regional and international opponents in the coming years.
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Iran is closer to the "nuclear threshold" than the bomb, with dismantling the weakest scenario until 2030
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