By Prof. Dr. Khaled Wasef Al-Wazani (Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Mohammed bin Rashid School of Government) China is no longer merely the 'factory of the world,' as it was commonly described over past decades. It has become the world's second-largest economy, a major powerhouse in trade, investment, and technology, and a global competitor in artificial intelligence, renewable energy, electric vehicles, batteries, and infrastructure. China is perhaps the primary player in global economic shifts—indeed, one could argue it will shape the new global economic order through the blocs it leads, such as BRICS, and through the new rules of the global economy it is helping bring to fruition. This includes digital currencies, local currency settlements for foreign trade payments, alternative networks to the SWIFT system, and alternative international institutions to the World Bank and the IMF. His Majesty King Abdullah II's current visit to China comes precisely within the context of steering the Jordanian economy toward leveraging China's capabilities across all these domains. It is time to transition the Jordanian-Chinese economic relationship from a model dominated by goods trade to a new paradigm based on investment, joint production, technology transfer, and exporting to third markets. For Jordan, China should not merely be a source of imports, but a destination for exports, a provider of investment and technology, and a partner in executing major mega-projects. The opportunity becomes even clearer when looking at China's expanding global investment footprint. China's total engagement in Belt and Road Initiative countries reached approximately $126.3 billion in the first half of 2026 alone, including nearly $49.8 billion in investments and $76.5 billion in construction contracts. These figures pose a legitimate question for Jordanian economic policymakers: What share of these massive investment flows can Jordan attract, and in which sectors can it engage? The first domain is infrastructure. China has accumulated extensive global expertise in constructing roads, railways, ports, and logistics zones. Jordan, which is currently developing its transport system and connecting Aqaba to production and logistics hubs, can attract Chinese capital and expertise for future projects through clear partnership and investment models, enhancing the Kingdom's position as a regional logistics hub without burdening the general budget with unsustainable liabilities. Water and energy represent another strategic area. The National Water Carrier project—aiming to desalinate around 300 million cubic meters annually and transport it across a 450-kilometer system at an estimated capital cost of $4.3 billion—highlights Jordan's future requirements for infrastructure, technology, and financing. Concurrently, the 2025–2035 Energy Strategy aims to increase the share of renewable energy in the electricity mix to 40% by 2035. Here, Chinese companies, with their accumulated capabilities in desalination, solar, wind, batteries, and energy storage, can serve as key partners in future projects and the investment framework tied to these transformations. The third domain is the economy of the future. Jordan possesses qualified human capital, while China possesses technology, capital, and advanced supply chains. Thus, partnerships can be forged in artificial intelligence, data centers, computing, electronic industries, and green energy—ensuring the objective goes beyond importing Chinese technology to transferring knowledge, building capacity, and establishing joint production within Jordan. In the opposite direction, the Chinese market should become a clear target for Jordanian exports. China's massive consumer market offers significant opportunities for pharmaceutical, food, chemical, fertilizer, potash, and phosphate products, alongside tourism, education, and digital services. Jordan likely needs a national export strategy tailored to China that identifies goods and services with a competitive advantage, addresses barriers to entry, and sets measurable quantitative targets for the next five to ten years. Diversifying export markets has itself become an essential component of strengthening economic resilience. However, the greatest opportunity, in my assessment, extends beyond bilateral trade itself. Why not establish a specialized Chinese industrial, technological, and logistical development zone in Jordan to attract Chinese companies for manufacturing, assembly, warehousing, and re-exporting? The idea is not to a new market to sell Chinese products within Jordan, as that would merely increase imports without adding sufficient value to the national economy. Rather, the goal is to transform Jordan into a Chinese production and export gateway to the region and the world. Chinese firms could leverage the Kingdom's strategic location, stability, Port of Aqaba, logistical network, and trade agreements to reach regional and international markets, in exchange for Jordan gaining investment, job creation, technology transfer, added value, and increased exports. This concept could materialize under a national initiative—for instance, titled 'The Jordanian-Chinese Gateway 2035'—offered as a comprehensive investment package covering industry, logistics, railways, renewable energy, water, technology, and AI, rather than dealing with each sector in isolation. It could set clear quantitative targets for Chinese investment, job creation, exports to China and third markets, local content ratios, and technology transfer. Successful economic relations today are not measured by the volume of goods one nation imports from another, but by the added value they together. Therefore, Jordan's opportunity with China lies not in increasing the influx of Chinese goods into the domestic market, but in attracting a portion of Chinese capital, technology, and production chains to Jordan. Ultimately, Jordan should view China not merely as a source for imports, but as an economy with which to invest, a market to export to, a technology to share, capital to attract, and a partner that can utilize Jordan as a platform for production and expansion across the region and the world. If effectively built, this partnership could transform Jordanian-Chinese relations from a traditional trade dynamic into a major driver of investment, economic diversification, and growth over the coming decade. The question that must remain before economic decision-makers is not 'How much do we import from China?' but 'How much can China invest, produce, and export from Jordan?' Website: Rum Online
By Prof. Dr. Khaled Wasef Al-Wazani (Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Mohammed bin Rashid School of Government) China is no longer merely the 'factory of the world,' as it was commonly described over past decades. It has become the world's second-largest economy, a major powerhouse in trade, investment, and technology, and a global competitor in artificial intelligence, renewable energy, electric vehicles, batteries, and infrastructure. China is perhaps the primary player in global economic shifts—indeed, one could argue it will shape the new global economic order through the blocs it leads, such as BRICS, and through the new rules of the global economy it is helping bring to fruition. This includes digital currencies, local currency settlements for foreign trade payments, alternative networks to the SWIFT system, and alternative international institutions to the World Bank and the IMF. His Majesty King Abdullah II's current visit to China comes precisely within the context of steering the Jordanian economy toward leveraging China's capabilities across all these domains. It is time to transition the Jordanian-Chinese economic relationship from a model dominated by goods trade to a new paradigm based on investment, joint production, technology transfer, and exporting to third markets. For Jordan, China should not merely be a source of imports, but a destination for exports, a provider of investment and technology, and a partner in executing major mega-projects. The opportunity becomes even clearer when looking at China's expanding global investment footprint. China's total engagement in Belt and Road Initiative countries reached approximately $126.3 billion in the first half of 2026 alone, including nearly $49.8 billion in investments and $76.5 billion in construction contracts. These figures pose a legitimate question for Jordanian economic policymakers: What share of these massive investment flows can Jordan attract, and in which sectors can it engage? The first domain is infrastructure. China has accumulated extensive global expertise in constructing roads, railways, ports, and logistics zones. Jordan, which is currently developing its transport system and connecting Aqaba to production and logistics hubs, can attract Chinese capital and expertise for future projects through clear partnership and investment models, enhancing the Kingdom's position as a regional logistics hub without burdening the general budget with unsustainable liabilities. Water and energy represent another strategic area. The National Water Carrier project—aiming to desalinate around 300 million cubic meters annually and transport it across a 450-kilometer system at an estimated capital cost of $4.3 billion—highlights Jordan's future requirements for infrastructure, technology, and financing. Concurrently, the 2025–2035 Energy Strategy aims to increase the share of renewable energy in the electricity mix to 40% by 2035. Here, Chinese companies, with their accumulated capabilities in desalination, solar, wind, batteries, and energy storage, can serve as key partners in future projects and the investment framework tied to these transformations. The third domain is the economy of the future. Jordan possesses qualified human capital, while China possesses technology, capital, and advanced supply chains. Thus, partnerships can be forged in artificial intelligence, data centers, computing, electronic industries, and green energy—ensuring the objective goes beyond importing Chinese technology to transferring knowledge, building capacity, and establishing joint production within Jordan. In the opposite direction, the Chinese market should become a clear target for Jordanian exports. China's massive consumer market offers significant opportunities for pharmaceutical, food, chemical, fertilizer, potash, and phosphate products, alongside tourism, education, and digital services. Jordan likely needs a national export strategy tailored to China that identifies goods and services with a competitive advantage, addresses barriers to entry, and sets measurable quantitative targets for the next five to ten years. Diversifying export markets has itself become an essential component of strengthening economic resilience. However, the greatest opportunity, in my assessment, extends beyond bilateral trade itself. Why not establish a specialized Chinese industrial, technological, and logistical development zone in Jordan to attract Chinese companies for manufacturing, assembly, warehousing, and re-exporting? The idea is not to a new market to sell Chinese products within Jordan, as that would merely increase imports without adding sufficient value to the national economy. Rather, the goal is to transform Jordan into a Chinese production and export gateway to the region and the world. Chinese firms could leverage the Kingdom's strategic location, stability, Port of Aqaba, logistical network, and trade agreements to reach regional and international markets, in exchange for Jordan gaining investment, job creation, technology transfer, added value, and increased exports. This concept could materialize under a national initiative—for instance, titled 'The Jordanian-Chinese Gateway 2035'—offered as a comprehensive investment package covering industry, logistics, railways, renewable energy, water, technology, and AI, rather than dealing with each sector in isolation. It could set clear quantitative targets for Chinese investment, job creation, exports to China and third markets, local content ratios, and technology transfer. Successful economic relations today are not measured by the volume of goods one nation imports from another, but by the added value they together. Therefore, Jordan's opportunity with China lies not in increasing the influx of Chinese goods into the domestic market, but in attracting a portion of Chinese capital, technology, and production chains to Jordan. Ultimately, Jordan should view China not merely as a source for imports, but as an economy with which to invest, a market to export to, a technology to share, capital to attract, and a partner that can utilize Jordan as a platform for production and expansion across the region and the world. If effectively built, this partnership could transform Jordanian-Chinese relations from a traditional trade dynamic into a major driver of investment, economic diversification, and growth over the coming decade. The question that must remain before economic decision-makers is not 'How much do we import from China?' but 'How much can China invest, produce, and export from Jordan?' Website: Rum Online
By Prof. Dr. Khaled Wasef Al-Wazani (Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Mohammed bin Rashid School of Government) China is no longer merely the 'factory of the world,' as it was commonly described over past decades. It has become the world's second-largest economy, a major powerhouse in trade, investment, and technology, and a global competitor in artificial intelligence, renewable energy, electric vehicles, batteries, and infrastructure. China is perhaps the primary player in global economic shifts—indeed, one could argue it will shape the new global economic order through the blocs it leads, such as BRICS, and through the new rules of the global economy it is helping bring to fruition. This includes digital currencies, local currency settlements for foreign trade payments, alternative networks to the SWIFT system, and alternative international institutions to the World Bank and the IMF. His Majesty King Abdullah II's current visit to China comes precisely within the context of steering the Jordanian economy toward leveraging China's capabilities across all these domains. It is time to transition the Jordanian-Chinese economic relationship from a model dominated by goods trade to a new paradigm based on investment, joint production, technology transfer, and exporting to third markets. For Jordan, China should not merely be a source of imports, but a destination for exports, a provider of investment and technology, and a partner in executing major mega-projects. The opportunity becomes even clearer when looking at China's expanding global investment footprint. China's total engagement in Belt and Road Initiative countries reached approximately $126.3 billion in the first half of 2026 alone, including nearly $49.8 billion in investments and $76.5 billion in construction contracts. These figures pose a legitimate question for Jordanian economic policymakers: What share of these massive investment flows can Jordan attract, and in which sectors can it engage? The first domain is infrastructure. China has accumulated extensive global expertise in constructing roads, railways, ports, and logistics zones. Jordan, which is currently developing its transport system and connecting Aqaba to production and logistics hubs, can attract Chinese capital and expertise for future projects through clear partnership and investment models, enhancing the Kingdom's position as a regional logistics hub without burdening the general budget with unsustainable liabilities. Water and energy represent another strategic area. The National Water Carrier project—aiming to desalinate around 300 million cubic meters annually and transport it across a 450-kilometer system at an estimated capital cost of $4.3 billion—highlights Jordan's future requirements for infrastructure, technology, and financing. Concurrently, the 2025–2035 Energy Strategy aims to increase the share of renewable energy in the electricity mix to 40% by 2035. Here, Chinese companies, with their accumulated capabilities in desalination, solar, wind, batteries, and energy storage, can serve as key partners in future projects and the investment framework tied to these transformations. The third domain is the economy of the future. Jordan possesses qualified human capital, while China possesses technology, capital, and advanced supply chains. Thus, partnerships can be forged in artificial intelligence, data centers, computing, electronic industries, and green energy—ensuring the objective goes beyond importing Chinese technology to transferring knowledge, building capacity, and establishing joint production within Jordan. In the opposite direction, the Chinese market should become a clear target for Jordanian exports. China's massive consumer market offers significant opportunities for pharmaceutical, food, chemical, fertilizer, potash, and phosphate products, alongside tourism, education, and digital services. Jordan likely needs a national export strategy tailored to China that identifies goods and services with a competitive advantage, addresses barriers to entry, and sets measurable quantitative targets for the next five to ten years. Diversifying export markets has itself become an essential component of strengthening economic resilience. However, the greatest opportunity, in my assessment, extends beyond bilateral trade itself. Why not establish a specialized Chinese industrial, technological, and logistical development zone in Jordan to attract Chinese companies for manufacturing, assembly, warehousing, and re-exporting? The idea is not to a new market to sell Chinese products within Jordan, as that would merely increase imports without adding sufficient value to the national economy. Rather, the goal is to transform Jordan into a Chinese production and export gateway to the region and the world. Chinese firms could leverage the Kingdom's strategic location, stability, Port of Aqaba, logistical network, and trade agreements to reach regional and international markets, in exchange for Jordan gaining investment, job creation, technology transfer, added value, and increased exports. This concept could materialize under a national initiative—for instance, titled 'The Jordanian-Chinese Gateway 2035'—offered as a comprehensive investment package covering industry, logistics, railways, renewable energy, water, technology, and AI, rather than dealing with each sector in isolation. It could set clear quantitative targets for Chinese investment, job creation, exports to China and third markets, local content ratios, and technology transfer. Successful economic relations today are not measured by the volume of goods one nation imports from another, but by the added value they together. Therefore, Jordan's opportunity with China lies not in increasing the influx of Chinese goods into the domestic market, but in attracting a portion of Chinese capital, technology, and production chains to Jordan. Ultimately, Jordan should view China not merely as a source for imports, but as an economy with which to invest, a market to export to, a technology to share, capital to attract, and a partner that can utilize Jordan as a platform for production and expansion across the region and the world. If effectively built, this partnership could transform Jordanian-Chinese relations from a traditional trade dynamic into a major driver of investment, economic diversification, and growth over the coming decade. The question that must remain before economic decision-makers is not 'How much do we import from China?' but 'How much can China invest, produce, and export from Jordan?' Website: Rum Online
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The Royal Gateway to China: From Goods Trade to Investment and Development Partnership
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