By Dr. Rashid Al-Shashani 'If I cannot contain the fire in my garden, I must allow it space to spread to the neighborhood.' Described as 'hasty' at best, the Iraqi government's position shifted—after initially threatening to deal with any arms outside the framework of the 'state' under anti-terrorism law—to extending the deadline on its final day, before this harsh tone softened through terms like 'freezing' and the like. We had previously pointed to leaks indicating a tacit agreement between the Prime Minister and the factions regarding the withdrawal of the factions' consent not to target US interests in exchange for this postponement. This new reality, which runs counter to the 'direction of traffic' on the American express route toward project completion, raises questions as to why the United States accepted the 'simplification' of the faction disarmament issue. Washington knows full well that these factions intend only to 'pull the rug' from beneath the US presence until the Trump era ends in the relatively long term, and until its path with Iran becomes clearer in the nearer term. This ambiguity—further complicated by Trump's escalating statements against Iran, which attempt to soften their weight via a 'forced landing' whenever Trump hints at an impending end to the war driven by elections and rising prices—served as a counter-ambush by Iran. Tehran sought to deny Trump the opportunity to trap President Pezeshkian following his statements in the United States, which drew internal attacks against him on the grounds that they contributed to lowering oil prices, thereby easing Trump's burdens. When Trump attempted to push the notion of 'hawks and doves' within the Iranian regime in an effort to a subversive opening, Iran responded by denying his military the opportunity to gauge its calculations, delivering a surprise military strike at the time. Trump's statements are inseparable from ground realities pushing military reinforcements—the latest being a third aircraft carrier—coinciding with a non-postponed withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. How can this be understood? The answer lies in the interaction of several elements. First is the apprehension among factions that have not handed over their weapons toward those that did—considering it a symbolic surrender of light arms—not to mention fears of a potential agreement between the government and these factions (with American coordination, naturally) regarding a post-disarmament role should pro-Iranian factions surrender their arms. Second is the presence of the Peshmerga forces belonging to the Kurdistan Region outside the scope of weapon control calculations, raising concerns over their status. Although it remains unconfirmed whether pro-Iranian factions raised this issue, such anxiety could extend to others, especially given the Iraqi President's defense of their constitutional status and their non-integration into the central army, as Washington did in Syria despite the differing contexts. Third is the US understanding of the dimensions of this 'war of nerves' strategy and how to manage conflict externally without immersing itself in costly and troublesome details. In other words, Washington's vision for the new phase of conflict with Iran relies on operating within spheres of influence while simultaneously seeking a swift strike, where the objective becomes 'whichever comes first.' Accordingly, the surplus of American power serves primarily to pace the conflict anticipated by Washington inside 'enemy territory,' as long as Iranian influence persists on Iraqi soil, alongside potential risks posed by incorporating separatist Kurdish forces. Most importantly is Turkey's caution regarding its 'gradual' withdrawal from the Zilikan base, anticipating an American risk of capitalizing on Kurdish force that could unravel alongside the unraveling Iraqi domestic scene—ultimately undermining what Ankara sought to contain. This will inevitably extend to Syria, which will redraw its internal map to align with the unfolding course of events. Source: Rum News Agency
By Dr. Rashid Al-Shashani 'If I cannot contain the fire in my garden, I must allow it space to spread to the neighborhood.' Described as 'hasty' at best, the Iraqi government's position shifted—after initially threatening to deal with any arms outside the framework of the 'state' under anti-terrorism law—to extending the deadline on its final day, before this harsh tone softened through terms like 'freezing' and the like. We had previously pointed to leaks indicating a tacit agreement between the Prime Minister and the factions regarding the withdrawal of the factions' consent not to target US interests in exchange for this postponement. This new reality, which runs counter to the 'direction of traffic' on the American express route toward project completion, raises questions as to why the United States accepted the 'simplification' of the faction disarmament issue. Washington knows full well that these factions intend only to 'pull the rug' from beneath the US presence until the Trump era ends in the relatively long term, and until its path with Iran becomes clearer in the nearer term. This ambiguity—further complicated by Trump's escalating statements against Iran, which attempt to soften their weight via a 'forced landing' whenever Trump hints at an impending end to the war driven by elections and rising prices—served as a counter-ambush by Iran. Tehran sought to deny Trump the opportunity to trap President Pezeshkian following his statements in the United States, which drew internal attacks against him on the grounds that they contributed to lowering oil prices, thereby easing Trump's burdens. When Trump attempted to push the notion of 'hawks and doves' within the Iranian regime in an effort to a subversive opening, Iran responded by denying his military the opportunity to gauge its calculations, delivering a surprise military strike at the time. Trump's statements are inseparable from ground realities pushing military reinforcements—the latest being a third aircraft carrier—coinciding with a non-postponed withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. How can this be understood? The answer lies in the interaction of several elements. First is the apprehension among factions that have not handed over their weapons toward those that did—considering it a symbolic surrender of light arms—not to mention fears of a potential agreement between the government and these factions (with American coordination, naturally) regarding a post-disarmament role should pro-Iranian factions surrender their arms. Second is the presence of the Peshmerga forces belonging to the Kurdistan Region outside the scope of weapon control calculations, raising concerns over their status. Although it remains unconfirmed whether pro-Iranian factions raised this issue, such anxiety could extend to others, especially given the Iraqi President's defense of their constitutional status and their non-integration into the central army, as Washington did in Syria despite the differing contexts. Third is the US understanding of the dimensions of this 'war of nerves' strategy and how to manage conflict externally without immersing itself in costly and troublesome details. In other words, Washington's vision for the new phase of conflict with Iran relies on operating within spheres of influence while simultaneously seeking a swift strike, where the objective becomes 'whichever comes first.' Accordingly, the surplus of American power serves primarily to pace the conflict anticipated by Washington inside 'enemy territory,' as long as Iranian influence persists on Iraqi soil, alongside potential risks posed by incorporating separatist Kurdish forces. Most importantly is Turkey's caution regarding its 'gradual' withdrawal from the Zilikan base, anticipating an American risk of capitalizing on Kurdish force that could unravel alongside the unraveling Iraqi domestic scene—ultimately undermining what Ankara sought to contain. This will inevitably extend to Syria, which will redraw its internal map to align with the unfolding course of events. Source: Rum News Agency
By Dr. Rashid Al-Shashani 'If I cannot contain the fire in my garden, I must allow it space to spread to the neighborhood.' Described as 'hasty' at best, the Iraqi government's position shifted—after initially threatening to deal with any arms outside the framework of the 'state' under anti-terrorism law—to extending the deadline on its final day, before this harsh tone softened through terms like 'freezing' and the like. We had previously pointed to leaks indicating a tacit agreement between the Prime Minister and the factions regarding the withdrawal of the factions' consent not to target US interests in exchange for this postponement. This new reality, which runs counter to the 'direction of traffic' on the American express route toward project completion, raises questions as to why the United States accepted the 'simplification' of the faction disarmament issue. Washington knows full well that these factions intend only to 'pull the rug' from beneath the US presence until the Trump era ends in the relatively long term, and until its path with Iran becomes clearer in the nearer term. This ambiguity—further complicated by Trump's escalating statements against Iran, which attempt to soften their weight via a 'forced landing' whenever Trump hints at an impending end to the war driven by elections and rising prices—served as a counter-ambush by Iran. Tehran sought to deny Trump the opportunity to trap President Pezeshkian following his statements in the United States, which drew internal attacks against him on the grounds that they contributed to lowering oil prices, thereby easing Trump's burdens. When Trump attempted to push the notion of 'hawks and doves' within the Iranian regime in an effort to a subversive opening, Iran responded by denying his military the opportunity to gauge its calculations, delivering a surprise military strike at the time. Trump's statements are inseparable from ground realities pushing military reinforcements—the latest being a third aircraft carrier—coinciding with a non-postponed withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. How can this be understood? The answer lies in the interaction of several elements. First is the apprehension among factions that have not handed over their weapons toward those that did—considering it a symbolic surrender of light arms—not to mention fears of a potential agreement between the government and these factions (with American coordination, naturally) regarding a post-disarmament role should pro-Iranian factions surrender their arms. Second is the presence of the Peshmerga forces belonging to the Kurdistan Region outside the scope of weapon control calculations, raising concerns over their status. Although it remains unconfirmed whether pro-Iranian factions raised this issue, such anxiety could extend to others, especially given the Iraqi President's defense of their constitutional status and their non-integration into the central army, as Washington did in Syria despite the differing contexts. Third is the US understanding of the dimensions of this 'war of nerves' strategy and how to manage conflict externally without immersing itself in costly and troublesome details. In other words, Washington's vision for the new phase of conflict with Iran relies on operating within spheres of influence while simultaneously seeking a swift strike, where the objective becomes 'whichever comes first.' Accordingly, the surplus of American power serves primarily to pace the conflict anticipated by Washington inside 'enemy territory,' as long as Iranian influence persists on Iraqi soil, alongside potential risks posed by incorporating separatist Kurdish forces. Most importantly is Turkey's caution regarding its 'gradual' withdrawal from the Zilikan base, anticipating an American risk of capitalizing on Kurdish force that could unravel alongside the unraveling Iraqi domestic scene—ultimately undermining what Ankara sought to contain. This will inevitably extend to Syria, which will redraw its internal map to align with the unfolding course of events. Source: Rum News Agency
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Extending the Deadline to Disarm Iraqi Factions
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