The question of Jordanian youth oscillating between influence and exclusion extends far beyond electoral moments; it penetrates the very structure of decision-making itself. The reality is that Jordan is a strikingly young country, carrying an exceptional demographic weight. Yet this demographic reservoir does not automatically translate into political influence. Since 2021, reforms have laid down new tracks: national party lists, explicit requirements for youth and women within party structures, and lower thresholds for electoral participation. However, the first real test of this new framework in September 2024 revealed a gap between text and practice: limited turnout, low youth presence in parliamentary seats, and behaviors that raised many questions. The train, indeed, has started moving, but in some stretches it still runs on old rails.
At its core, the political climate continues to treat elections as competitions of individuals and local networks rather than contests of parties and programs. Including a young man or woman in the top five spots of a list is important, but it does not guarantee the rise of an entire generation when the social base of parties remains weakly organized and tethered to electoral seasons. The scene is akin to pumping fresh air into a closed room: the rules have changed, but the cycle of political oxygen has not yet been completed.
The economy frames this entire picture. High unemployment—particularly among youth—erodes confidence in political effectiveness. A young person struggling for a job today is less likely to invest in the long-term journey of party work unless they see tangible benefits to their daily life. Here, politics and livelihood intersect: unless the language of reform translates into jobs, microcredit, and measurable training and skill-building programs, a large portion of the youth will remain caught between apathy and protest voting. The ballot box, in such cases, becomes more a vent for frustration than a platform for influence.
Institutional signals are also mixed. Freedom rankings have improved modestly in some indexes, yet reports and lived experiences point to restrictions at certain junctures. This contradiction confuses emerging parties and frustrates a youthful public that seeks fair competition and safe spaces for organizing and expression. Stable and consistent rules of the game across multiple cycles are a prerequisite for trust; no young person builds a partisan career on shifting ground that trembles with every election season.
One structural dilemma is the imbalance between local districts and the national district. The more weight allocated to national, party-based representation, the greater the chance for cross-regional programs to emerge, and the higher the likelihood that young leaders will rise from the realm of ideas. A technical review of the law and its practical effects, along with transparent publication of candidacy and success rates, would make the debate public and concrete—while discouraging any backsliding into outdated modes of representation.
Political parties themselves face the challenge of institutional capacity. Growth of membership into the tens of thousands is noteworthy, but remains numerical unless it is translated into training circles, shadow-parliamentary programs, and local outreach plans that bring the party from newspaper headlines into people’s daily lives. Building pathways for youth advancement—from student committees to political offices—marks the difference between a seasonal party and a generational one. When young people know there is a clear path from training seats to legislative seats, the decision to join becomes a rational investment rather than a symbolic gamble.
Exacerbating matters, a portion of the political elite remains captive to a mindset of self-replication. The same faces reappear each cycle, not out of confidence in the younger generation, but as a symptom of political bankruptcy. These figures seek to 'polish' their image by adding a few youth, not to empower them but to use them as fuel or as bridges to fill gaps in legitimacy and public acceptance. In this context, youth representation does not become a genuine project for building future leadership, but a cosmetic device that drains youthful energy without granting it real institutional impact or influence in decision-making.
In the short term, it is unrealistic to expect youth to settle the battle of decision-making overnight or within a single electoral cycle. Yet in the medium term, the window for decisive influence appears open—if three conditions converge: institutionalization of party politics as the main channel of representation, expansion of the national list to counterbalance the fragmentation of local districts, and tangible economic improvement for young people. Only then will demographic weight be converted into political weight, and youth representation will become a natural outcome rather than a cosmetic exception.
Here, foresight is not a luxury but a practical tool. If the current system continues with gradual improvements in party representation rules, and if government or semi-independent programs annually produce thousands of youth trained in public policy and legislation, then within a decade we may see a parliament with a substantial youth bloc that mirrors the demographic reality of society. If, however, reforms remain on paper, economic pressures persist, and the environment of freedom and organization wavers, the scene will regress into a cycle of apathy and electoral seasonality.
Today, the ball lies in three adjacent courts: the state, tasked with guaranteeing fair rules and expanding national representation; the parties, responsible for evolving from banners into institutions that build young leaders and move beyond recycled faces; and the youth themselves, who must shift from the stance of spectators and critics to spaces of organization and action.
When these fields converge on the foundation of an economy that provides opportunities and pathways, the answer to the central question will shift from “not yet” to “yes”—not in slogans, but through an electoral and institutional balance of power that places youth at the heart of decision-making rather than at its margins.
In conclusion, the struggle over political decision-making in Jordan is less a clash of ages than a contest of modes of representation. Reforms have opened the door, but crossing it requires cohesive youth organization, a political framework that unifies youthful energies, an economy that gives politics meaning, and a stable competitive environment. If these converge, the label of “generation of the future” will no longer be accurate—youth will become the generation of decision, reshaping the political landscape in its programs, its representation, and its outcomes.
Dr. Laith Abdullah Al-Qahiwi
The question of Jordanian youth oscillating between influence and exclusion extends far beyond electoral moments; it penetrates the very structure of decision-making itself. The reality is that Jordan is a strikingly young country, carrying an exceptional demographic weight. Yet this demographic reservoir does not automatically translate into political influence. Since 2021, reforms have laid down new tracks: national party lists, explicit requirements for youth and women within party structures, and lower thresholds for electoral participation. However, the first real test of this new framework in September 2024 revealed a gap between text and practice: limited turnout, low youth presence in parliamentary seats, and behaviors that raised many questions. The train, indeed, has started moving, but in some stretches it still runs on old rails.
At its core, the political climate continues to treat elections as competitions of individuals and local networks rather than contests of parties and programs. Including a young man or woman in the top five spots of a list is important, but it does not guarantee the rise of an entire generation when the social base of parties remains weakly organized and tethered to electoral seasons. The scene is akin to pumping fresh air into a closed room: the rules have changed, but the cycle of political oxygen has not yet been completed.
The economy frames this entire picture. High unemployment—particularly among youth—erodes confidence in political effectiveness. A young person struggling for a job today is less likely to invest in the long-term journey of party work unless they see tangible benefits to their daily life. Here, politics and livelihood intersect: unless the language of reform translates into jobs, microcredit, and measurable training and skill-building programs, a large portion of the youth will remain caught between apathy and protest voting. The ballot box, in such cases, becomes more a vent for frustration than a platform for influence.
Institutional signals are also mixed. Freedom rankings have improved modestly in some indexes, yet reports and lived experiences point to restrictions at certain junctures. This contradiction confuses emerging parties and frustrates a youthful public that seeks fair competition and safe spaces for organizing and expression. Stable and consistent rules of the game across multiple cycles are a prerequisite for trust; no young person builds a partisan career on shifting ground that trembles with every election season.
One structural dilemma is the imbalance between local districts and the national district. The more weight allocated to national, party-based representation, the greater the chance for cross-regional programs to emerge, and the higher the likelihood that young leaders will rise from the realm of ideas. A technical review of the law and its practical effects, along with transparent publication of candidacy and success rates, would make the debate public and concrete—while discouraging any backsliding into outdated modes of representation.
Political parties themselves face the challenge of institutional capacity. Growth of membership into the tens of thousands is noteworthy, but remains numerical unless it is translated into training circles, shadow-parliamentary programs, and local outreach plans that bring the party from newspaper headlines into people’s daily lives. Building pathways for youth advancement—from student committees to political offices—marks the difference between a seasonal party and a generational one. When young people know there is a clear path from training seats to legislative seats, the decision to join becomes a rational investment rather than a symbolic gamble.
Exacerbating matters, a portion of the political elite remains captive to a mindset of self-replication. The same faces reappear each cycle, not out of confidence in the younger generation, but as a symptom of political bankruptcy. These figures seek to 'polish' their image by adding a few youth, not to empower them but to use them as fuel or as bridges to fill gaps in legitimacy and public acceptance. In this context, youth representation does not become a genuine project for building future leadership, but a cosmetic device that drains youthful energy without granting it real institutional impact or influence in decision-making.
In the short term, it is unrealistic to expect youth to settle the battle of decision-making overnight or within a single electoral cycle. Yet in the medium term, the window for decisive influence appears open—if three conditions converge: institutionalization of party politics as the main channel of representation, expansion of the national list to counterbalance the fragmentation of local districts, and tangible economic improvement for young people. Only then will demographic weight be converted into political weight, and youth representation will become a natural outcome rather than a cosmetic exception.
Here, foresight is not a luxury but a practical tool. If the current system continues with gradual improvements in party representation rules, and if government or semi-independent programs annually produce thousands of youth trained in public policy and legislation, then within a decade we may see a parliament with a substantial youth bloc that mirrors the demographic reality of society. If, however, reforms remain on paper, economic pressures persist, and the environment of freedom and organization wavers, the scene will regress into a cycle of apathy and electoral seasonality.
Today, the ball lies in three adjacent courts: the state, tasked with guaranteeing fair rules and expanding national representation; the parties, responsible for evolving from banners into institutions that build young leaders and move beyond recycled faces; and the youth themselves, who must shift from the stance of spectators and critics to spaces of organization and action.
When these fields converge on the foundation of an economy that provides opportunities and pathways, the answer to the central question will shift from “not yet” to “yes”—not in slogans, but through an electoral and institutional balance of power that places youth at the heart of decision-making rather than at its margins.
In conclusion, the struggle over political decision-making in Jordan is less a clash of ages than a contest of modes of representation. Reforms have opened the door, but crossing it requires cohesive youth organization, a political framework that unifies youthful energies, an economy that gives politics meaning, and a stable competitive environment. If these converge, the label of “generation of the future” will no longer be accurate—youth will become the generation of decision, reshaping the political landscape in its programs, its representation, and its outcomes.
Dr. Laith Abdullah Al-Qahiwi
The question of Jordanian youth oscillating between influence and exclusion extends far beyond electoral moments; it penetrates the very structure of decision-making itself. The reality is that Jordan is a strikingly young country, carrying an exceptional demographic weight. Yet this demographic reservoir does not automatically translate into political influence. Since 2021, reforms have laid down new tracks: national party lists, explicit requirements for youth and women within party structures, and lower thresholds for electoral participation. However, the first real test of this new framework in September 2024 revealed a gap between text and practice: limited turnout, low youth presence in parliamentary seats, and behaviors that raised many questions. The train, indeed, has started moving, but in some stretches it still runs on old rails.
At its core, the political climate continues to treat elections as competitions of individuals and local networks rather than contests of parties and programs. Including a young man or woman in the top five spots of a list is important, but it does not guarantee the rise of an entire generation when the social base of parties remains weakly organized and tethered to electoral seasons. The scene is akin to pumping fresh air into a closed room: the rules have changed, but the cycle of political oxygen has not yet been completed.
The economy frames this entire picture. High unemployment—particularly among youth—erodes confidence in political effectiveness. A young person struggling for a job today is less likely to invest in the long-term journey of party work unless they see tangible benefits to their daily life. Here, politics and livelihood intersect: unless the language of reform translates into jobs, microcredit, and measurable training and skill-building programs, a large portion of the youth will remain caught between apathy and protest voting. The ballot box, in such cases, becomes more a vent for frustration than a platform for influence.
Institutional signals are also mixed. Freedom rankings have improved modestly in some indexes, yet reports and lived experiences point to restrictions at certain junctures. This contradiction confuses emerging parties and frustrates a youthful public that seeks fair competition and safe spaces for organizing and expression. Stable and consistent rules of the game across multiple cycles are a prerequisite for trust; no young person builds a partisan career on shifting ground that trembles with every election season.
One structural dilemma is the imbalance between local districts and the national district. The more weight allocated to national, party-based representation, the greater the chance for cross-regional programs to emerge, and the higher the likelihood that young leaders will rise from the realm of ideas. A technical review of the law and its practical effects, along with transparent publication of candidacy and success rates, would make the debate public and concrete—while discouraging any backsliding into outdated modes of representation.
Political parties themselves face the challenge of institutional capacity. Growth of membership into the tens of thousands is noteworthy, but remains numerical unless it is translated into training circles, shadow-parliamentary programs, and local outreach plans that bring the party from newspaper headlines into people’s daily lives. Building pathways for youth advancement—from student committees to political offices—marks the difference between a seasonal party and a generational one. When young people know there is a clear path from training seats to legislative seats, the decision to join becomes a rational investment rather than a symbolic gamble.
Exacerbating matters, a portion of the political elite remains captive to a mindset of self-replication. The same faces reappear each cycle, not out of confidence in the younger generation, but as a symptom of political bankruptcy. These figures seek to 'polish' their image by adding a few youth, not to empower them but to use them as fuel or as bridges to fill gaps in legitimacy and public acceptance. In this context, youth representation does not become a genuine project for building future leadership, but a cosmetic device that drains youthful energy without granting it real institutional impact or influence in decision-making.
In the short term, it is unrealistic to expect youth to settle the battle of decision-making overnight or within a single electoral cycle. Yet in the medium term, the window for decisive influence appears open—if three conditions converge: institutionalization of party politics as the main channel of representation, expansion of the national list to counterbalance the fragmentation of local districts, and tangible economic improvement for young people. Only then will demographic weight be converted into political weight, and youth representation will become a natural outcome rather than a cosmetic exception.
Here, foresight is not a luxury but a practical tool. If the current system continues with gradual improvements in party representation rules, and if government or semi-independent programs annually produce thousands of youth trained in public policy and legislation, then within a decade we may see a parliament with a substantial youth bloc that mirrors the demographic reality of society. If, however, reforms remain on paper, economic pressures persist, and the environment of freedom and organization wavers, the scene will regress into a cycle of apathy and electoral seasonality.
Today, the ball lies in three adjacent courts: the state, tasked with guaranteeing fair rules and expanding national representation; the parties, responsible for evolving from banners into institutions that build young leaders and move beyond recycled faces; and the youth themselves, who must shift from the stance of spectators and critics to spaces of organization and action.
When these fields converge on the foundation of an economy that provides opportunities and pathways, the answer to the central question will shift from “not yet” to “yes”—not in slogans, but through an electoral and institutional balance of power that places youth at the heart of decision-making rather than at its margins.
In conclusion, the struggle over political decision-making in Jordan is less a clash of ages than a contest of modes of representation. Reforms have opened the door, but crossing it requires cohesive youth organization, a political framework that unifies youthful energies, an economy that gives politics meaning, and a stable competitive environment. If these converge, the label of “generation of the future” will no longer be accurate—youth will become the generation of decision, reshaping the political landscape in its programs, its representation, and its outcomes.
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Jordanian Youth Between Influence, Exclusion: Will Generation of Future Decide Political Game?
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