jordan pulse -

By Dr. Rashid Al-Shashani
As is our custom, we read the scene far from the rejoicing of onlookers and those racing to play the round of "determine who is the victor" when judging the clauses of an agreement, a memorandum of understanding, or a framework between the United States and Iran. It is enough that a single one of these clauses could take a hundred years to define its scope of application—not because of its general and loose phrasing, nor because these clauses amount to nothing more than the immediate need that carried the delegations of the two countries to Pakistan, but rather behind it lies a set of considerations. Chief among them is Trump’s realization that waiting for one of the two strikes of the war—which we have previously discussed—would double the cost of these experiments of his.
Beyond that, it would drag him into a loss; this loss would be met with a counter-reaction to the pressure, in which Iran might resort to executing internal strikes, whether within the United States or in other countries hosting American bases or interests. Trump’s pressure, through his short-lived blockade, perhaps did not initially calculate this danger. However, the course of events caught up with his recklessness after an idea sparked in his mind that would be highly effective for Iran, based on executing an operation similar to, or even superior to, the October 7th operation. Is it not Iran that took charge of its planning, supply, and supervision?!
Away from such fears, and given the scale of the cost, both sides wanted to stand in a "moving while standing" position that grants each of them an "anti-defeat" opportunity. Yet, the mere fact that Trump arrived at this conclusion necessarily means an advantage on the side of the Iranian camp. This advantage, which may not be deemed a victory—or perhaps it is, but of a unique kind—proceeds guided by markers that no matter how much anyone exaggerates in denying them, the coming days will confirm their correctness, namely the "chaos of anxiety" turning into the "anxiety of chaos."
This rests on several matters:
First: A question; which American president will dare attack Iran after this experience, and indeed even Trump himself—if we exclude the two strikes of this war? Connected to this is an idea revolving around a dispute within the pillars of Trump’s administration, a dispute seen only by the "shrewd ones." We have previously said that Trump’s officials, particularly his Secretary of Defense Hegseth, are merely compliant tools in his hand and flexible in responding to his dreams. This was the reason for choosing them, not their capabilities. All that occurred between them was a dispute over the quality of their execution of Trump’s dreams, and blaming one another for the failure, in addition to a war of survival before a democratic society that determines the identity of its rulers by approval of them, in light of the looming expiration of Trump’s term with no hope of renewal.
Second: It became clearly evident that American and Israeli intelligence information falls short of comprehending the capacity of Iranian warfare. Along with this appeared a need to enter sites whose importance was highlighted by recent operations. These sites either lie in the path of the Strait of Hormuz, which is "normally" open to all, or can be reached through it, making it possible to establish espionage points—even through parties allied with the United States, or even enemies that provoke no suspicion. The matter is not limited to espionage, but may include anchoring operational points with which ground control can be tightened after swift, effective field preparations made in short periods during battles, without needing European and allied intelligence information that was hidden from the United States and could have altered the course of events.
Third: This American gameplay stands on the shoulders of European and other parties. The idea of signing the memorandum at the Palace of Versailles was not a message of apology to Macron for Trump’s blunt stances; rather, it added to the mission of "melting down the victory" of the Pakistani mediator and downplaying the efforts of the region's countries. This idea entangled Macron, not only in the responsibility for the "Strait of Hormuz operations" but also in exempting Trump from a new defeat before European leaders, after his voice had grown exhausted narrating stories of their betrayal.
In such a context, Macron takes charge of his European "group" to assist him, taking into account Macron’s attempts to play an important role in Lebanon, which has now become forced to deal with a reality that is Hezbollah. Trump’s latest trick was his Secretary of Defense Hegseth's statement at a meeting of NATO defense ministers regarding a 6-month review concerning the presence and deployment of American forces in Europe, which panicked European leaders due to the need to compensate for this force, before they rushed to flatter Trump at the G7 summit. They wanted to achieve a victory before their people in a battle they were not a party to, following their "loss of face" with Trump, and as a counterbalance to the latter after they had tried to form a united front against the United States in supporting Ukraine and through Zelenskyy's attendance at their summit.
Fourth: Macron was no smarter than anyone else; in the course of this pursuit of his, he got entangled in the swamp of the necessity of dealing with Hezbollah, in addition to managing the coordination of handling pressure pushing toward a Syrian intervention, in exchange for pushing Netanyahu to retreat and leave the task to "Trump’s new institution for countering Iran"—an institution whose utility Netanyahu does not trust as he makes his post-Trump calculations, or calculates the chaos of what is to come and the danger of Iran's militias even with Trump’s presence.
With this complexity, Iran will need to divide its efforts across several locations, each of which imposes a reality differing from its current state. This will summon those with old dreams and those with recent defeats into the camp of cooperation with Iran. We emphasize that this is bound to happen, whether Trump succeeds in toppling the Iranian regime through coming attempts or fails to do so.