jordan pulse -

By Dr. Rashed Al-Shashani
The recent Yemeni government measures against officials of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its president will be ineffective. Similarly, the concept of integrating various militias—by distributing them across the Ministries of Defense and Interior—will ultimately lead to the birth of a new dominant ruling class. In the absence of a singular, controlling military power, the growing anxieties of the people of Hadramout serve as a prime example of these complications.
The true shifting variable on Yemeni soil is not merely the internal rifts within the Presidential Leadership Council or the fear of one faction dominating another. Rather, we must analyze the calculated agendas of the active powers in Yemen and their external backers. Each of these backers envisions a fundamentally different path to achieve the shared objective of preventing the advancement of extremist groups.
Focusing on Saudi Arabia—which backs the Presidential Leadership Council—it is clear that Riyadh is pursuing a distinct policy aimed at regulating these dynamics through closely aligned local leaders capable of navigating its vision. This reflects Saudi Arabia's broader regional strategy to establish sustainable peace.
Conversely, other external actors are backing factions that stand in direct ideological opposition to the targeted groups. While a shared desire to stabilize Yemen might theoretically unite these backers, unexpected circumstances always arise—particularly given Saudi Arabia's newly adopted political frameworks in dealing with the international community.
Following a period where the U.S.–Iran conflict reached a standstill—leaving Washington struggling to process unexpected strategic setbacks—the necessity of counteracting American attempts to dominate regional self-determination became evident. In contrast, other external factions supporting the South Yemen movement have relied on a fading premise: that the long arm of the United States guarantees absolute unilateral dominance to anyone who aligns with its agenda, which inherently requires avoiding any friction with Israel.
The core issue is not simply engaging with Israel, but rather treating it as the sole gateway for geopolitical relations. However, shifting regional dynamics have granted Iranian-backed militias an operational cushion. This space is forced by Washington's current caution as it seeks to avoid slipping further into complex regional quagmires.
This expanded operational space for militias will inevitably compel Israel to alter the nature of its pressure on Iran. This is especially true given Donald Trump's attempts to keep Israel from destabilizing the Lebanese front, as he seeks a strategic window to close the Iranian file on his own terms.
Consequently, we are on the verge of witnessing the birth of new militias that differ in both form and identity. These groups will not necessarily be under direct Israeli management; other regional actors may facilitate their emergence. These indirect Israeli strikes against Iran will likely bypass Lebanon and Iraq temporarily to avoid drawing American ire or disrupting the delicate diplomatic mission of Tom Barack. This bypass is only temporary, as actions on those fronts remain highly probable, with ripples likely extending into neighboring states. It is worth noting that Barack does not view decentralization or federalism as viable systems for the region—a perspective shared by Massad Boulos, whose statements emphasize a unified Yemen and supporting neighboring countries against the Houthis.
As this reality takes hold, the Yemeni arena will witness a new template of confrontation against the Houthi movement. However, the reshaping of the Yemeni conflict is not governed solely by this emerging variable; it is heavily dictated by the nature of the newly evolving relations with Iran, whether by Saudi Arabia or other states. Furthermore, we are seeing the rise of a new wave of conflict centered around political Islam, one that discards its traditional rules. This shift will also impact regional minorities and alter their political trajectories—the recent visit of Mazloum Abdi to France is a telling indicator of this trend.
On the domestic front, we must realize that the Houthi movement, along with other Iranian-backed militias, is being pushed by Iran into a state of "brinkmanship." This is forcing these groups to fundamentally rethink the basis of their presence and supply lines, especially given their control over vital geopolitical choke points. Specifically for Yemen, this implies that the distribution of power in the conflict will undergo a massive upheaval—one that may dwarf the political realignments witnessed during the era of the late Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Former enemies will turn into allies and vice versa, but in a "hybrid" fashion that defies traditional definitions of alliance and enmity. This will ultimately transform the relational fabric of external backers as global interests shift in the wake of recent American policy setbacks.
Looking at the traditional map of factional powers in Yemen, the proposed idea of merging these factions and distributing them between military and security forces will act as a fragmenting factor rather than a unifying one. This failure stems from the total absence of a superior, central power capable of subduing these factions beyond mere transactional deal-making and short-term gains. This same fate awaits other countries attempting a similar approach; from our perspective, integrating independent factions into state structures without a dominant stabilizing force only yields deeper division.
Ultimately, this landscape will render the continued approach of external backers—focusing solely through the lens of countering the Houthi movement—entirely unproductive and costly. Efforts to unite the various South Yemeni factions and other rivals around this single objective have become obsolete. Saudi Arabia and other regional powers have already begun building bridges of cooperation with Iran and have even encouraged Lebanon to do the same. This represents a significant step toward breaking away from ineffective American leverage. However, this shift will inevitably introduce fresh anxieties to the region, as Washington attempts to push back against this geopolitical defiance—a dynamic where Syria’s intervention in Lebanon will not be the only source of regional friction.