jordan pulse -

Ahmad Abdelbaset Rjoub 

Researcher and strategic planner

As the 60-day deadline for the ceasefire between the United States and Iran expires, President Donald Trump finds himself at a difficult crossroads, facing two risky choices: launching a new military operation against Iran or waiting until the U.S. midterm congressional elections in three months, while economic stagnation and its domestic political consequences continue to grow.

The White House is under mounting pressure after tough economic sanctions and a tightening naval blockade failed to force Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which has become the region’s main flashpoint. Iran, meanwhile, maintains that keeping the strait closed is a legitimate negotiating tool in response to what it describes as U.S. economic aggression.

The Trump administration had bet that its maximum-pressure strategy and military threats would compel Tehran to back down. Yet, as of August 20, the strait remains largely closed to international shipping. Iran has linked its reopening to the implementation of the memorandum of understanding, including guarantees for lifting sanctions and recovering frozen funds, while Washington considers these demands unacceptable.

The strait has therefore evolved from a strategic maritime passage into a focal point of diplomatic and legal confrontation, with both sides using their available leverage to complicate the other’s calculations.

Economically, the prolonged crisis has pushed oil prices higher and intensified inflationary pressures on the United States and its allies in Europe, Asia and the Gulf, all of which depend on the strait for energy supplies. Iran, meanwhile, is suffering from declining oil revenues and a shortage of liquidity. Both sides are consequently caught in a cycle of mutual economic damage, with neither appearing to have an easy way out.

Domestically, Trump’s political opponents have accused him of failing to achieve his stated goal of preventing Iran from closing the strait. Iran’s leadership, for its part, faces criticism over the economic cost of the crisis, including the weakening currency and rising inflation. Nevertheless, Tehran’s hard-line camp continues to support resistance, arguing that any concession would amount to a victory for Washington.

The central question is whether the failure of sanctions and the blockade will push Trump toward military escalation in an attempt to secure a political victory before the elections. In my view, a limited strike could provide temporary political cover, but it could also trigger an Iranian response that would be difficult to contain and potentially lead to a wider regional war—an outcome neither Washington nor Tehran appears to want.

Both sides therefore seem, at their core, to prefer avoiding direct confrontation while maintaining reciprocal threats. Trump is looking for a diplomatic deal that he can present domestically as a political achievement, while Iran seeks economic and political gains without losing face at home.

The upcoming midterm elections are a crucial factor in Trump’s calculations. A war could carry significant political costs, while allowing the current crisis to continue would keep fuel prices and inflation under pressure. Tehran may calculate that the closer the elections approach, the more constrained Washington will become, giving Iran additional leverage at the negotiating table.

The recent congressional resolution calling for an end to hostilities with Iran further reflects political divisions in Washington and imposes additional constraints on the military option. As Iran continues to strengthen its defensive and missile capabilities, the potential cost of military action becomes even higher.

Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz is no longer merely a maritime crisis; it has become a test of Trump’s ability to achieve his objectives without plunging the region into another war. Caught between war and elections, both choices remain bitter, while a diplomatic deal—despite its difficulties—may prove less costly than either alternative.