jordan pulse -
Dr. Mahmoud Awad Al-Dabbas
Jordanian public opinion was initially emotional in its interaction with the arrest and trial of MP Imad Al-Adwan in Israeli prisons and courts, but it soon held its breath or reduced its interaction. In parliament, some deputies appeared at the beginning of the scene, but later they stopped making statements that were biased towards the representative of aggression and hostile to Israel and her narration. This was followed by an unannounced suspension of parliament sessions during the last two weeks, current and previous, of the current parliamentary session, of which one week remained. As a result, attention focused on the aggression's lawyers, who have not met him yet, by a decision of the Israeli court, which at the same time renewed his suspension. Officially, there is only a simple statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another statement by the Jordanian ambassador there confirming and confirming the follow-up of the matter. In conclusion, everyone remained silent so that the state could devote itself to accomplishing its mission, deciphering the issue and finding a solution. Noting here that this is the first time that the state has succeeded in controlling the rhythm of the street with what it wants and what serves the goal.
In stopping at the form of the Jordanian-Israeli relationship over the past decades, it is a relationship that can be described as a strong relationship in two areas and weak in a third. The relationship between the two parties is strong in the military and security fields and strong in the economic aspect, most notably the gas, water and electricity agreements, but it is a conflicting and contradictory relationship in the political field that pertains to the future of the Palestinian state and the issue of the Hashemite Custodianship over the sanctities there. Concerning the differences that were occurring between the two parties in the political field, the current parliament and the one that preceded it was a council that put pressure on the government in the relationship in Israel. The deputies wanted to cancel the gas agreement, and they wanted to cancel the treaty, and they wanted to expel the Israeli ambassador, but in front of all these successive demands, the political system did not accept it. The matter is much more complicated than that. Later, and within the context of the controversy or the wide distance between the parliament and successive governments in relation to Israel, the case of the deputy aggression came in terms of shifting from mere sufficiency in statements condemning Israel towards what is further?.
We go back to the past years and ask how the two parties dealt with the emergency differences between them. In the year 1997 A.D., when the Jordanian soldier, Ahmad al-Daqamseh, killed Israeli female students in al-Baqoura, the matter ended with his trial by Jordan, with compensation being paid to the families of the victims. After that, there was an attempt to assassinate Khaled Meshaal, a leader in the Hamas movement. At that time, King Hussein's extremism was the solution. The treaty was on one side, and Khaled Meshaal's life was on the other side. At the end of the matter, Meshaal's life was saved, the political exchange deal was launched, and the story ended. The third story of significance was the incident of the Jordanian judge who was killed on the border in the year 2014 AD, in which Jordan did not achieve any significant achievements. Then came the story of the embassy guard in the year 2017 AD, who killed two Jordanians, and who was handed over to his country because he had a diplomatic status with the pledge to prosecute him there and he did not This is done, but at a later time it was agreed to pay compensation to the families of the Jordanian victims with the change of the Israeli ambassador, the appointment of a new one, and the reopening of the embassy here after it was closed for five months. Years later, and in the year 2018 AD, work on the annexes of Al-Baqoura and Al-Ghamr in the Wadi Treaty was suspended, and the crisis was overcome, as there was a division within Israeli society, according to a research study, and the crisis was overcome, although this was not actually acceptable to Israel, but it was officially accepted and did not escalate politically. In the year 2019 AD, an Israeli infiltrated into Jordan was tried and imprisoned here for several months, and there was no escalation between the Jordanian and Israeli sides about that, so it was not important to the Israeli government.
In the analysis of the methods of the two parties in resolving the previous emergency crises between them, there were several methods. The first method is the method of theoretical or actual trial of the perpetrator in his country of nationality (an actual trial of the Daqamseh in Jordan in the year 1997 AD and a theoretical trial of the Israeli embassy guard in the year 2017 AD). As for the second method, it is the actual trial of the perpetrator of the act in the courts and prisons of the other party (the trial of the Israeli serial killer in the Jordanian courts and his imprisonment in the year 2019 AD). As for the third method, it is the method of paying compensation to the families of the victims (in 1997, compensation was paid to the families of Israeli female students, and in 2019, compensation was paid to the victims of the Israeli embassy incident in Jordan). The fourth method is political intransigence, so there is no trial or compensation (the case of the Jordanian judge Zuaiter in 2014 AD). The fifth method was the political exchange of prisoners between the two parties (the incident of the attempted assassination of Meshaal in 1997 AD). The sixth method was official acceptance despite the implicit political rejection (Israel's official acceptance of canceling the work of the Al-Baqura and Al-Omar annexes in the year 2018 AD). From this review of the methods of solution adopted by the two parties, we can conclude here that Jordan was strong in all settlements of previous crises. It achieved something in every settlement except for the case of Judge Zuaiter, for which Jordan did not achieve anything as a result of the intransigence of the Israeli side.
Today, there are many options being offered here and there for the release of Representative Imad Al-Adwan, who has been detained in Israeli prisons for two weeks and is being tried there. These options are multiple, some of which are inspired by the previous methods used by the two parties in resolving thorny or urgent issues between them, and there may be other options in this case. The most prominent of these options that are being talked about as leaks are as follows: The first option is the release of Representative Al-Adwan without trial in the courts Of course, this Israeli measure may come as repayment for previous Jordanian positions, most notably Jordan's release of the Israeli security guard who killed two Jordanian citizens in the past years (repeated method). The second option is Israel's continuation in stopping the aggression deputy, trying him, and imprisoning him in Israeli prisons (repeated method). The third option is to release the representative, Al-Adwan, but with the stipulation that he be tried in the Jordanian courts quickly and imprisoned for the least (repeated method). The fourth option, which is the most important and dangerous option, is thinking outside the box, which is represented in exchanging it with Jordanian prisoners or others inside Jordanian prisons as a result of judicial rulings issued against them (repeated method), noting here that this request may also come from an Arab or international party playing a secret role. In ending this crisis, they are concerned with one or more prisoners in Jordanian prisons. The fifth option is the existence of an Israeli request to conclude a new agreement with the Jordanian government regarding the security of crossings and bridges and in a formula that serves Israel a lot (a new method).
In conclusion. Just as the incident of the arrest of Representative Imad Al-Adwan was not the first incident in the crisis of the relationship between the Jordanian parties on the one hand and the Israeli side on the other hand, it is so, and it may not be the last, as many reasons reproduce additional subsequent crises. But in all cases, the two parties, despite the differences between them, the truth is that the relationship between them is a strategic relationship and not a temporary relationship for known reasons. Therefore, the solution will come in a way that guarantees the preservation of the relationship between them, with the harshness of the solution agreement on the Jordanian side this time?..Maybe!.