jordan pulse -

The total population of South Yemen, the political situation, shifting alliance loyalties, and the reliance on changing leaderships have collectively redefined the very concept of a "minority." It is no longer restricted to numbers, race, religion, or color; rather, it has become a marker of submission to blackmailing factions.
Consensus meetings and the situational need to halt a conflict that cannot be decisively won mean that state-building is an objective far beyond the scope of settlements produced by such efforts. Ultimately, these groups turn into a burden that the patron state—which, by its nature, cannot establish actual state institutions—seeks to neglect.
Transitional leaderships are an inevitable byproduct of this burden, fizzling out as soon as the interests they were meant to serve yield no new prospects. Observing recent statements by former first-tier Yemeni officials, who have tried to slip back into the spotlight by playing the tune of youth and women's roles, provides damning evidence of a system built on division and mutual benefits. These individuals are mere partners in a transactional project; they are utterly incapable of stopping a war or enforcing state sovereignty. For them, the imagery of conferences and televised appearances is enough before the decay of their legacy catches up with them.
A division of this nature entangles various ideologies. When scrutinizing the configuration of the Yemeni leadership scene, we find an opportunistic assembly: Islamist forces opposed to previous regimes who claim moderation whenever it overlooks a landscape of personal interests, allowing them to jump ship whenever the need arises. At the same time, they oppose the Houthis, who in turn converge with similar or identical Iranian-backed Islamist forces. It appears that "Hamas" is not merely an organization, but an idea manipulated by states and exploited by Iran, which thrives on playing all sides to establish an easily movable foothold as conditions shift.
How can a state be built upon the rubble of this predatory opportunism?!
In another scene, figures who used to attack a specific country are now preparing to hold meetings within that very nation to resolve the southern issue. Compounding Yemen's crisis is the fact that those currently holding the reins of power are the backbone of the late Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime, and they are merely seeking to fix its problems. Where were all of these people—the champions of youth and women, the icons of moderation, and the symbols of legitimacy—before reaching this destiny?
Is this tragic state of Yemen not the product of their own making?
Confronting these developments, most notably the Houthi mobilization, we see its intensity receding on the Saudi front as the group seeks understandings with Riyadh, even if it requires making concessions. Meanwhile, Washington is attempting to dilute Saudi Arabia's influential role in Lebanon through the recent framework agreement, while ignoring Senator Marco Rubio's visit to the Kingdom. Consequently, Saudi Arabia stands before two choices that must be navigated: either allow the Houthis to advance to crush Emirati influence, or crack down on them, which would conversely mean retreating in favor of the UAE. However, the sudden question remains: will this containment happen through the gateway of the Houthis or the gateway of Iran? There is a stark difference between the two. Perhaps Saudi Arabia's strategic interest necessitates building direct bridges with Iran's proxies, independently of Iran itself.
Following this bizarre geopolitical landscape—which has likely not escaped Israel's calculations—we can issue a warning to the people of South Yemen: prepare for an Israeli infiltration. This penetration will sneak in by tempting leaders with promises of providing support for the cause of independence. It mimics the historical patterns seen with the Kurds, Druze, and Alawites of Syria, whom Israel inundated with promises that uprooted their old hopes, only to plunge them far below where they started.
Saudi Arabia's interests in the Bab al-Mandab Strait are driving it to ease its crisis with the Houthis, especially after Iran demonstrated its firm grip on the Strait of Hormuz. This interest will move parallel to accommodating attempts to suffocate Iran in Lebanon via neighboring intervention, which will subsequently push Tehran to solidify its influence in Yemen.
Finally, to prevent another "Mazloum Abdi" from emerging in South Yemen—ready to freely surrender territories large enough to build a state and resources far exceeding that—and to ensure that a people's dream does not perish at the hands of those begging for support from ungrateful entities, Yemenis in general, and the people of the South in particular, must change their philosophy regarding the form of leadership and the path to state-building. They must take into account the absolute necessity of discarding the traditional concepts of centralization, decentralization, federalism, and similar frameworks from their calculations entirely.