jordan pulse -

​By Dr. Rashed Al-Shashani
​July 31, 2026
​Before the ink of our predictions regarding an Israeli move has dried—a move dictated by the necessity of repelling waves of surprises, meaning that these movements might be defensive in nature at this stage rather than offensive—the Israeli army announced its destruction of tunnels beneath Mount Shaqif, within the framework of what we anticipate in the stumbling of Trump, who surprised Netanyahu by announcing an agreement with Hamas regarding its weaponry at the very same time.
​Certainly, Netanyahu was not entirely absent from this agreement, but Washington's direction does not appeal much to Israel, and vice versa—especially given the discrepancy in marketing the Israeli army's withdrawal operation in Gaza and elsewhere, which was spearheaded by Ben-Gvir's attack amid the absence of an official comment.
​Trump, who wanted to disorient Iran by declaring that he will continue delivering strikes—attempting to escape its disruption caused to him by striking ships in the Strait of Hormuz—placed Netanyahu in a bind so that he would not "break loose" and commit a folly whose burden Trump cannot bear. Voices calling on Netanyahu to stop in Gaza have grown louder, the latest being the Prime Minister of Italy, Meloni.
​Infiltrating Iran's proxies is an idea present in our plans before coming to Washington's mind. Therefore, we see in it what the latter does not see: Iran's rejection of Hamas's agreement and the latter's disregard for this rejection will not be a prize in Trump's hands, not only because he is not adept at this kind of game, but because Hamas itself cannot shed its cloak of maneuvering and attempting to seize the spotlight after arranging an agreement with a party while harboring a betrayal against it—just as it did on "October 7," when Iran left it to its fate after Hamas disavowed leading Iran's plan for the operation, driven by the incitement of a certain party and its belief that Iran would rush behind it out of self-interest.
​Lurking around Hamas's jump ropes prompted the Islamic Jihad movement to express reservations over what was stated in the agreement's announcement, in which Israel's stance was limited to media leaks stating its rejection. This means that from all aspects—most importantly from Washington's side—it signifies nothing more than: "infiltrating a snakes' den with a dish of honey."
​Elaborating on this form brings us back to Washington's attempt to isolate Iran's proxies in exchange for the allure of reaching power in all its attempts with Iran's proxies. This is not our primary focus, but rather the state of evading responsibility sought by Hamas and others—even if draped in the mantle of protecting the Palestinian people—such that it takes an irresponsible stance in defending Iran to spare itself from Trump's wrath, while simultaneously maintaining the attire of "selling the resistance commodity" in the markets of Iran, Turkey, and elsewhere.
​Therefore, talk began immediately that the deal is not a surrender of weapons—in the sense of selling out principle—but merely storage and oversight. Outside that market, we do not know what the practical difference between the two is.
​Trump knows this very well; we said he would move toward playing with the region's nerves. Iran likewise knows that Hamas wants to deal it a blow in return for having left it to its fate in October, on one hand. On the other hand, Iran is waiting for these factions to be backed into the corner of the American "entrapment" so that it can reshape its affiliated factions, as we previously mentioned.
​The game of "counter-moves"—Trump with Netanyahu, Trump and Netanyahu toward Iran, Trump and Netanyahu toward Iran's proxies, the proxies versus Iran, the proxies confronting one another—will necessarily give birth to a new feature of the upcoming phase—which we had previously pointed to—summarized in striking the traditional form of the proxies, along with the power of the relevant regimes, which is a necessary prerequisite for upcoming changes. In our context, the concept of "counter-moves" does not mean acting in the opposite manner, but rather as dictated by the sudden situation, not by a pre-arranged plan.
​If we want to cite a quick example: we point to the bickering among political heavyweights due to statements by the leader of the Sadrist Movement regarding "impudent militias," at the very moment he affirms brotherhood with Saudi Arabia while equating it with brotherhood with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
​Another runway in the "game of counter-moves" is embodied in the Lebanese President's attempt to lessen Saudi Arabia's weight in his endeavor to visit Turkey—perhaps trying to pull it (i.e., Saudi Arabia) toward increasing interest in Lebanese affairs, particularly financial support. We see no basis for rumors about reassuring Turkey regarding the framework agreement with Israel and its threat to Turkish national security, for Erdogan's hostility toward Israel is governed by "resistance market stock indicators," and the framework agreement is not strong enough to solve a "A'bkah"—meaning a "brawl" in the Jordanian dialect.